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Introduction 
 
Many fisheries around the world have been subject to significant reform or are undergoing 
major review.  Such reform will seriously affect existing patterns of entitlement and regulation.  
This in turn is likely to generate resistance to change and, in some cases, legal challenge.  At a 
time when the use of rights-based entitlements to regulate fisheries is receiving serious 
attention, there is growing interest in seeking out means of challenging what is perceived to be 
the privatisation of a public good.1  The present paper reflects upon some historical aspects of 
fishing rights under the common law and considers how this may limit or influence future 
changes in the regulation of fisheries.  In particular, it is concerned with the so-called public 
right to fish within the common law.  In broad terms the public right to fish describes a form of 
entitlement to fish that cannot be removed by the Crown.  It is thus suggestive of certain limits 
on the regulatory authority of the government to use certain instruments such as private 
property rights to regulate marine fisheries.  More generally it might seem to embody the idea 
                                                   
1 On the development of property rights generally, see A. Scott, The Evolution of Property Rights (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008).  On some of the limits of property rights see R. Barnes, Property Rights 
and Natural Resources (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 
Copy Edited Manuscript
Click here to download Copy Edited Manuscript: Barnes_edited.doc
 2 
that the resource is reserved for use in the wider public good or is reserved to ensure that 
certain public needs can be met. 
This may seem to be a rather restricted field of enquiry, but it should be remembered 
that the English common law underpins many legal systems around the world.  Moreover, the 
specific notion of a public right to fish has manifested itself repeatedly in institutions within 
common law legal systems, such as the public trust doctrine in US jurisprudence and fisheries 
law in Australia.  This suggests that an understanding of the public right to fish under the 
common law is not or of merely limited concern to students of English legal history.  Moreover, 
it is also clear that in any legal system, the baseline legal status of fishing rights may affect 
subsequent legal developments.  Take, for example, the recent resort to human rights law, as 
illustrated by the recent United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) ruling against Iceland.  
All exploitable marine fish stocks to the limit of Iceland’s 200-nautical-mile (nm) exclusive 
fishing zone are the common property of the Icelandic nation.2  This means that fisheries have 
an important public function.  Since 1975, many fisheries have been subject to rights-based 
management as individual quotas were introduced into the herring fishery.3  This shift in 
regulatory focus has not been without its difficulties and there have been numerous challenges 
to both the system and the particular allocation of quotas.4  This came to international 
prominence in 2007, when the HRC ruled on the legality of aspects of the Iceland’s fisheries 
management regime.5  In 2001 two fishermen, Erlingur Sveinn Haraldsson and Orn Snaevar 
Sveinsson, challenged the quota system after they purchased a boat but were unable to obtain a 
fishing quota.  Although they could lease a quota, this was at such a high rate as to make fishing 
wholly unprofitable.  They decided to fish without a quota and challenge the ITQ system in the 
Icelandic courts.  After the Icelandic Supreme Court ruled that the quota system was 
constitutional, they filed a claim with the HRC.  Much of the issue turned on whether the 
introduction of privately held quotas was in the public good.  For example, Iceland argued and 
the authors of the complaint accepted that measures to limit over-fishing were necessary, and 
that the public interest required restrictions on the freedom of individuals to engage in 
commercial fishing.6  However, it was also asserted that such restrictions should be of a general 
nature, reasonable, and that all persons meeting such a requirement should have an equal 
chance of access to quotas.  Although not fully reasoned, the HRC ruled that ‘the property 
                                                   
2 Article 1 of the Fisheries Management Act 2006.   
3 The Fisheries Management Act 1990 placed all commercial fisheries under a complete system of ITQs 
(Fisheries Management Act, No. 38, 15th May 1990). This Act was re-issued as the Act on Fisheries 
Management 2006, which is a consolidated version of fisheries legislation since 1990 (Act 116 of 10 
August 2006). 
4 Barnes, above note 1, pp. 354-5. 
5 Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland of 24 October 2007, Communication No. 1306/2004 
6 Ibid., para 6.6. 
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entitlement privilege accorded permanently to the original quota owners, to the detriment of 
the authors, is not based on reasonable grounds.’ 7 Furthermore, Iceland is ‘under an obligation 
to provide the authors with an effective remedy, including adequate compensation and review 
of its fisheries management system’. 8  It is not clear how far-reaching the decision of the HRC 
will be, but it seems that some reform of the fisheries management regime will be required to 
ensure Iceland’s compliance with general human rights obligations.  The case shows how much 
legal context matters, and also how the previously public character of a resource imposed 
certain limits on the subsequent regulatory shape of entitlements.  
The paper is divided into four sections.  In the first part, some brief observations are 
made on the importance of historical ideas in the process of legal change.  In the second part, the 
treatment of the legal nature of fishing rights by leading commentators is briefly considered.  
This is then examined in light of its treatment in the common law.  In part four, the nature and 
extent of this right as it currently operates are examined.  Finally, some brief observations are 
offered on its potential role as a regulatory tool.  However, these are points that will require 
more careful consideration and merit more detailed treatment than is possible in the present 
paper. 
 
Some Reflections on the Role of Historical Rights 
  
The history of law plays a vital role in the process of law reform.  Of course change may be 
motivated by multiple social, economic and economic reasons, but when it occurs in law, it must 
also be evaluated in light of what is legally permissible and desirable.  So when we seek to 
reform the law, we measure the change against the yardstick of what the law allows and what 
will be deemed to be legally acceptable.  This process of weighing up the possibility and 
desirability of legal change is an incredibly difficult but necessary process.  Law is the product of 
many tensions.  For example, the law of the sea is in part a result of the tension between mare 
liberum and mare clausum, the tensions between coastal state and flag state authority, the 
tensions between inclusive and exclusive claims to oceans use, the tensions between certainty 
and flexibility.  There are many other complex tensions, such as those between commercial and 
environmental concerns, and between development and conservation.  The law of the sea, as a 
process, seeks to mediate between these tensions and to accommodate as far as possible the 
range and quality of interests possessed by the principal actors and subjects involved in oceans 
use.  Law is a dynamic process that evolves to meet new challenges presented by changing 
knowledge and circumstance.  This process is massively complex, having evolved over hundreds 
                                                   
7 Ibid., para 10. 
8 Ibid., para 12. 
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of years to meet innumerable circumstances.  For the student of the law of the sea, one small 
window into this complexity is to recall the view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC or the Convention)9 as a package deal, that is to say the product of legal and 
political negotiations that has resulted in a careful balance of the interests between States and 
groups of States in respect of the Convention’s substantive rules.10  Of course, the LOSC is 
merely one, albeit significant, part of the law of the sea, which in turn is but one part of general 
international law, which is in turn one dimension of law that continues to operate at regional 
and domestic levels.  Legal change may be politically, or socially, or economically, or 
scientifically driven, but it must still occur through legal channels.  As such, the case for or 
against change will be couched in legal terms, at least in part.  The way in which law can 
produce complex balances of rights and responsibilities is well illustrated, even over a short 
time, by the case of Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland noted above.  
Just as commentators warn against trying to unpick the LOSC, care must be taken in 
trying to adjust any legal relationship, for each legal relationship forms part of a complex array 
of interests that are affected by change.  For example, if a fishing practice is shown to be 
unsustainable, then it may be prohibited or qualified.  This in turn may result in fishing effort 
being channelled into other areas or towards other species.  It may generate political and 
economic pressure to compensate fishermen for lost income.  It may increase pressure on 
welfare mechanisms.  This is to say nothing of the complex impacts that may occur within the 
ecosystem itself.   So far this might seem to read against a caution against change.  It is a 
warning certainly, but perhaps only to pay heed to risks of careless disregard of legal context.  
The following review of the public right to fish in the common law explores one strand of legal 
development and indicates the complexity that forms part of the legal context.  
As might be expected when we begin to explore the Byzantine development of the 
common law, the public right to fish is not a straightforward matter. Indeed, the leading 
commentary on the development of fisheries law in Great Britain, Moore and Moore’s The 
History and Law of Fisheries (1903), begins by noting that there is considerable confusion in the 
law.11  Misconceptions about facts have arisen and undue weight has been attributed to the 
dicta of ancient writers.  This has resulted in the ‘enunciation of principles very often 
inconsistent with the true facts as to the existence, nature and attribute of fisheries’.12  This is, as 
shown below, particularly the case in respect of the public right to fish.  Furthermore, the 
                                                   
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. 1833 UNTS 3; (1982) 21 ILM 1261. 
10 See H. Caminos and M. Molitor, ‘Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal’ 
(1985) 79 AJIL 871. 
11 S.A. Moore and H.S Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (London, Stevens and Haynes, 1903), pp. v-
vii. Hereinafter, ‘Moore and Moore’. 
12 Ibid., p. vi. 
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concepts used to describe public and private fishing rights are not always used consistently.13  
This makes it difficult to plot the precise development and content of the public right to fish.  
Unlike international fisheries, there have been few detailed considerations of fishing rights in 
domestic law.  In 1875, Hall examined some fisheries law as part of his broader treatise on 
rights of the sea shore.14 In 1904, the American writer Henry P. Farnham provided a quite 
detailed account of fisheries.15  The most recent edition of Wisdom’s Law of Watercourses 
devotes some attention to the nature and extent of the right, although this is necessarily 
succinct as it is merely one aspect of a more general examination of the law relating to 
watercourses.16  Appleby has been keen to raise awareness of the right, but is concerned that it 
can be used to sustain a culture of overfishing.17 
Despite some complexity or ambiguity in the nature and extent of the public right to fish, 
it is possible to construct some general delineations of the right in the common law and the key 
academic commentaries on fishing rights.  By providing an account of the public right to fish we 
are able to gauge the extent to which potential regulatory change, such as the introduction of 
stronger rights-based entitlement in fisheries, can be accommodated within the common law.  
 
 
A Brief Survey of Commentaries on Marine Fisheries in the Common Law 
    
Prior to Moore and Moore, there was no systematic doctrinal analysis of the actual origins and 
development of the public right to fish. The earliest legal authorities tended to ignore marine 
fisheries. Thus Johnston notes that the Romans had little interest in maritime law or fisheries, 
other than as ancillary to assertions of military authority.18  Roman law merely regarded fish as 
ferae naturae which were free to capture by all, and this exerted a strong influence on both civil 
and common law doctrines. Under feudal law, authority was derived from ownership of land 
and this could not be applied to the sea.19  This perpetuated a de minimis approach to fisheries 
regulation.  Of course, feudal law did admit private grants of fishery rights in rivers and limited 
                                                   
13 Ibid., p. xxxvii; Also, Malcomson v. O’Dea (1862) 10 HL 593, per Wiles, J. 
14 R.G. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of the Subject in the Sea-Shores of the Realm 
2nd ed. (William Waler, London, 1875). 
15 Henry P. Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights (Rochester, The Lawyers Cooperative 
Publishing Company, 1904). 
16 W. Howarth, Wisdom’s Law of Watercourses 5th ed. (Crayford, Shaw & Sons, 1992), esp. 176-82. 
17 T. Appleby, ‘The public right to fish.  Is it fit for purpose?’ (2005) 16 Water Law 201.  This generated 
some response.  See P. Scott, ‘Another view of the public right to fish – and the question of regulation or 
ownership’ (2008) 19 Water Law 37; T. Appleby, ‘Response to “Another view of the public right to fish – 
and the question of regulation or ownership”’ (2008) 19 Water Law 41. 
18 D.M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 158-9  
19 See P.T. Fenn, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1926), pp. 66-7. 
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coastal waters, and as the monarchs sought to bestow privileges on favoured subjects, such 
rights were generally quite limited in marine areas.  This approach was largely consistent with 
predominant natural law doctrines which favoured the equal rights of all men in certain 
commons. When the matter was considered in legal writing, it was briefly done, and usually as 
part of a wider treatise on maritime law or, indeed, the common law in general.  Henry de 
Bracton, writing his treatise on the Laws and Customs of England in the 13th century, merely 
asserted that the seas are common to all as of natural right, and this extends to the right of 
fishing in ports and rivers.20  This seems to be a simple assertion drawn directly from Roman 
law without other authority.  In 1569, Thomas Digges asserted the crown’s right of property in 
the sea and seabed, observing that Kings have suffered fishermen to use the seas under the jure 
gentium.21   It is unclear how far this approach became accepted.  For example, it was rejected by 
Plowden, a leading lawyer, in Sir John Constable’s case, but accepted by Sir John Dee.22   
Taking a broader perspective on maritime authority in general, it may be noted that 
prior to the seventeenth century it was not at all clear that States had the right or desire to claim 
any authority over marine spaces and so guarantee any rights of fishing for their subjects.  
Certainly, as is noted below, there is evidence of claims to public and private fishing rights 
dating back to the early 17th century, but there was little coherence to such claims.23   Later 
decisions seemed to assume a degree of coherence in the law or attempted to retrospectively 
impose a sense of order on the pre-existing uncertainty.  It was not until the 16th century that 
States began to assert limited jurisdiction over coastal waters, thereby creating the conditions 
for more extensive domestic fishing rights.  And it was not until the 17th century that writers 
such as Grotius and Selden devoted any time to considering the regulation of coastal spaces and 
presenting a systematic account of rights and duties therein, and of their philosophical or legal 
basis.  From this point on more coherent accounts of fishing rights, which reconciled domestic 
practices with the limits of State authority, were possible.  In short, the vast scale of the oceans, 
the general absence of conflicts between users which might generate a political motive for 
regulation, the practical difficulties of asserting authority and the absence of a clear juridical 
basis for exclusive claims combined to produce a general liberty to use the seas.  As Judge 
Alvarez stated in his Individual Opinion in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ‘[f]or centuries, 
because of the vastness of the sea and the limited relationships between States the use of the 
                                                   
20 De Legibus et Consuetudinibus (trans. T. Twist)(London, Longman and Co. ), p.57. 
21 T. Digges, Arguments proving the Queens Maties Propertye in the Sea Landes and Salt Shores Thereof 
(1569), reprinted in S.A. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and the law relating thereto. With a hitherto 
unpublished treatise by Lord Hale, Lord Hale's “De Jure Maris,” and Hall's Essay on the Rights of the Crown in 
the Sea-shore, 3rd ed. (1888), p. 185. 
22 Sir John Dee, General and Rare memorials pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navigation (1577). 
23 Moore and Moore indicate the existence of tidal fisheries as far back as the Domesday book in the 11th 
century.  However, this appears to be simply evidence of a practice.  The actual legal basis of such 
fisheries is not at all clear.  See above note 11, pp. 1-5 and 6. 
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sea was subject to no rules; every State could do as it pleased’.24   There were limited exceptions 
to this, as noted below, but these tended to be ad hoc and highly localised situations.   
Matters began to change in the early 17th century.  The colonial ambitions of European 
powers generated considerable interest in the legal regime of the seas, and the legitimacy of 
claims to inclusive or exclusive authority.  Grotius, acting on behalf of the Dutch East Indies 
Company, sought to defend the freedom of the Dutch to navigate the oceans and advanced his 
theory of mare liberum against the exclusive maritime dominion asserted by Spain and Portugal.   
The British soon entered this debate, initially as a means of defending the interests of domestic 
fishermen against the more effective Dutch fishing fleet that was thriving in the North Sea, and 
then using fisheries as the foundation of its maritime wealth and power.25  A strong domestic 
fishery could supply the skill and experience necessary for the development of a powerful navy. 
Among the first jurists to assert a coastal State’s claim to exclusive authority over fisheries was 
the Scots lawyer William Welwood in 1613, who argued that overfishing demanded some 
means of reserving coastal fisheries for the coastal State.26  As he wrote: 
‘the primitive and exclusive right of the inhabitants of a country to the fisheries along their 
coasts; one of the principal reasons for which this part of the sea must belong to the littoral 
State being the risk that these fisheries may be exhausted as a result of the free use of them by 
everybody.’27  
His argument was intended to justify British claims against other States, rather than designate 
fisheries as either public or private.  Of course, a claim to an exclusive fisheries right against 
other States could only have persuasive force if the right was vested in the authority of the King 
rather than in the ordinary people.  Claims of individuals could not be made against foreign 
powers, but rights of the King could.  The King was the external representation of the State.  The 
important point to note is that the strength of any rights or liberty of private persons for fishing 
was contingent upon the Crown’s ability to defend such claims externally.  Thus fishing rights 
were intimately related to the assertion of Crown authority in their formative stages.  
The 17
th
 century witnessed a marked outpouring of legal opinions devoted to defending the 
claims to Crown authority over coastal waters.  In a series of lectures delivered at Grey’s Inn, Serjeant 
Callis argued for a Mare Anglicum on the basis of sovereignty, jurisdiction, property and possession.
28
 
In 1633, Sir John Burroughs wrote The Sovereignty of the British Seas which forcefully argued for 
English dominion over the seas, drawing upon an array of documents.  However, Fulton notes 
                                                   
24 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case [1951] ICJ Rep. 116, 146. 
25 See T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (London, Blackwood, 1911), chapters IV and V. 
26 See M.J van Ittersum, ‘Mare Liberum Versus the Propriety of the Seas?’  (2006) Edinburgh Law Review 
239. 
27 W. Welwood, An Abridgment of All Sea Laws (1613), chapter 26. 
28 R. Callis, Reading of the famous and learned Robert Callis, esqr., upon the Statute of Sewers (1622) 23 
Hen. VIII., c. 5, 16. (Fourth ed. by W.J. Broderip, 1824). 
 8 
that the treatise was more a list of claims and devoid of reason based upon law.29  Moreover it 
was not published until 1651 and so was limited in its initial influence.  John Selden assumed 
the mantle and presented the most compelling defence of English authority over coastal waters 
in his treatise Mare Liberum (1635).30  Unlike Welwood, Selden was more concerned with 
maritime authority in general, rather than the limited matter of fisheries.  That said, the need to 
secure exclusive State authority over fisheries was necessary for Selden.  The sea, ‘by reason of 
other men’s Fishing, Navigation and Commerce, becomes the wors for him that owns it and 
others that enjoie it in his rights; so that the less profit ariseth, then might otherwise bee 
received therby.’31  For a time, the book assumed both legal and political significance because its 
publication coincided with Charles I’s assertions of maritime authority against European 
nations.  Its subsequent legal authority was strengthened through the approval of later writers 
such as Coke,32 Godolphin,33 Zouche,34 Codrington,35 Meadows,36 and Hale, discussed in more detail 
below.  
Although freedom of the seas became the dominant principle of maritime relations between 
States, it was yet conceded that a limited band of coastal waters was subject to the exclusive authority 
of the coastal States.
37
  This allowed for the development of more sophisticated domestic law rules 
pertaining to coastal fisheries.  In the common law the most important and detailed treatment of 
the subject was provided by Lord Hale, who wrote De Jure Maris circa 1670.38  As the most 
eminent judge of his generation, unsurprisingly, Hale’s legal opinions became highly 
authoritative in the common law courts and references to De Jure Maris or Hale are a common 
feature of many 18th- and 19th-century decisions concerning fisheries in tidal waters.39  Hale 
states the origin of the public right of fishing in tidal waters to be in the King’s ownership of the 
soil of the sea.40  He goes on to note that ‘... the common people of England have a regular liberty 
                                                   
29 Fulton, above note 25, p. 366. 
30 J. Selden, Mare Clausum (1635), translation by M. Needham (London, 1652). 
31 Ibid., bk 1, p. 141. 
32 Although Coke’s Fourth Institute was published posthumously, it does however give a more considered 
view of the nature of the Crown’s rights of property in the English seas.  Sir E. Coke, The Fourth Part of the 
Institutes of the Lawes of England (1644), c. 22, 142. 
33 J. Godolphin, A View of the Admiral Jurisdiction (1661). 
34 R. Zouche, The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Asserted (1663), p. 20. 
35 R. Codrington, His Majesty's Propriety, and Dominion on the Brittish Seas Asserted: together with a true 
account of the Neatherlanders insupportable insolencies (1665), p. 1. 
36 Sir P. Meadows, Observations Concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas (1689), p. 42. 
37 Barnes, above note, 1, pp. 183ff. 
38 Hale’s treatise was actually part of a larger tract in three parts: ‘Pars prima. De Jure Maris et 
Branchiorum eiusdem. Pars Secunda. De Portibus Maris. Pars tertia. Concerning the customs of goods 
imported and exported’.  De Jure Maris is reprinted in Moore, above note 21. 
39 See for example Bagott v. Orr (1801) 2 B. & S. 472.  Lord Blackburn quotes extensively from Hale in 
Neill v. Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App. Cas. 135; Reece v. Miller and others, (1882) 8 QBD 626, per 
Grove, J.; Henry Blake and Johyn Goodman, the Younger v. The Mayor and free Burgesses of the Borough of 
Saltash, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 633, per L. Blackburn (651); R. v. Musson, 8 E. & B. 900, 27 L. J. (M.C.) 100. 
40 De Jure Maris, p. 378. 
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of fishing in the sea or creeks and arms thereof, as a public common of piscary, and may not, 
without injury to their right, be restrained of it, unless in such places, or creeks, or navigable 
rivers where either the King or some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that 
common liberty.’41  This much differs little from the above commentaries, but stresses that the 
right of the King generates a common right of fishing.  This position is then little considered by 
writers, or, indeed, challenged, until the 20th century.  
 
Origin of the Public Right to Fish 
 
As the above review of legal commentaries reveals, the position developed that both the public 
right of fishing and any private exception to this were rooted in the Crown’s ownership of the 
sea.  Given such assertions of a right of ownership, it is important to see the extent to which this 
was manifest in domestic law.  The point of origin of this right in law is not entirely clear, but it 
is often mistakenly attributed to the Magna Carta.  For example, in the recent High Court 
decision in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council (1993), Evans LJ stated that ‘[b]efore Magna 
Carta, the Crown made grants of 'several fisheries' (private fishing rights) in areas of tidal 
waters, but this was regarded as an abuse which Magna Carta ended in 1215.’  42   However, the 
Magna Carta says nothing directly about private or public rights in marine fisheries.  And it is 
certainly clear that it makes no such prohibition on private rights.  The only relevant provisions of 
the charter are Chapter 23 and Chapter 16 (of the third revision).  Chapter 23 reads: ‘Omnes kidelli 
decetero deponantur penitus per Tamisiam et Medeweiam et per totam Angliam, nisi per costeram 
maris.’  This translates as ‘All fish-weirs shall be removed from the Thames, the Medway, and 
throughout the whole of England, except on the sea coast.’  The provision was apparently 
designed to protect free navigation on rivers, hence the requirement to remove obstacles to 
navigation on rivers, but not the sea-coast, where weirs would not necessarily impede 
navigation.43  Farnham, a leading US scholar who researched the development of waters rights 
extensively under the common law, notes that the Charter simply cannot sustain the 
interpretation placed upon it.44   The other provision relied upon as limiting the Crown’s right to 
grant a several fishery (private property in a fishery) is attributed to Blackstone, who stated 
that exclusive rights of fishing in “public” rivers could not ‘at present be granted, by the express 
provision of magna carta, c. 16’.45  This assertion is not supported by the actual text of chapter 
16, which translates as: ‘No river banks shall be guarded (placed in defence – defandantur) from 
                                                   
41 Ibid., p. 377. 
42  Anderson v. Alnwick District Council [1993] 3 All ER 613, per Evans LJ at 621. 
43 In support of this view, see Hale, De Jure Maris, chapter 3.  
44  Farnham, above note 15, para 369. 
45 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) at 417. 
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henceforth, but such as were in defence in the time of King Henry, our grandfather, by the same 
places and the same bounds as they were wont to be in his time.’46 It is doubtful that this can be 
read as precluding the grant of several fisheries, and Farnham attributes the error to Coke, who 
incorrectly read the provision as affecting the grant of private fisheries.47 
If the attribution of the public right of fishing to the Magna Carta is a legal fiction, then 
how far back can the right be traced as a matter of law?  Most authorities and judges attribute 
the rule to the House of Lords in the seminal case of William Malcomson v. John O’Dea and Others 
(1863).48  As noted below, a number of earlier cases did uphold the right, but as decisions of 
lower courts they are not regarded as important.  Malcomson is authority for the position that 
the Crown cannot grant a several fishery since the Magna Carta, and that in the absence of any 
such proven claim there remains a general public right of fishing on tidal waters.49  The 
limitation on the creation of private fisheries is not complete.  Thus Malcomson partially 
circumvents its own prohibition on new grants by permitting exclusive rights to be acquired by 
prescription, through evidence of long-standing exclusive use of a fishery, which cannot be 
traced back to a time subsequent to the Charter.50  Interestingly, the law report actually records 
the view that the Magna Carta could not sustain the meaning placed upon it.51  However, in 
delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, Mr Willes, J, stated that: ‘The soil of "navigable 
tidal rivers," like the Shannon, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is prima facie in the Crown, 
and the right of fishery prima facie in the public. But for the Magna Carta, the Crown could, by its 
prerogative, exclude the public from such a prima facie right, and grant the exclusive right of 
fishery to a private individual, either together with or distinct from the soil. And the great 
Charter left untouched all fisheries which were made several, to the exclusion of the public, by 
Act of the Crown not later than the reign of Henry II.’  Although earlier cases touched upon this 
matter, it is more than arguable that this was at least an example of judicial law-making.  Of 
course, this would only be acceptable if the outcome was also politically desirable, and it seems 
clear that by the mid-nineteenth century there were strong social, economic and political 
reasons to support a strong public fishing industry absent any limitations under private law.  
Britain was at the forefront of the industrial revolution and needed to satisfy the appetites of a 
growing population.52  Knauss notes that in 1866 a Royal Commission famously repealed in 
whole or in part 65 pieces of legislation that limited fishing efforts.  Capturing the free market 
                                                   
46 Translation from Farnham, above note 14, p. 1369.  The provision was added in 1225. 
47 Farnham, above note 15, p. 1370, para 369. 
48 (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155. (Hereafter Malcomson). 
49 See Moore and Moore, above note 11, p. 8-18. 
50 Malcomson v. O’Dea, at 618.  Also Duke of Northumberland v. Houghton, (1870) LR  5 Ex. 127; Tighe v. 
Simnot [1897] Ir. R. 140. 
51 Above note 48, at 603. 
52 J.A. Knauss , ‘The Growth of British Fisheries During the Industrial Revolution’ (2005) 36 Ocean 
Development and International Law 1-11. 
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political context rather nicely, he quotes Thomas Huxley, President of the British Royal Society 
and one of the most influential figures in the regulation of British fisheries of the time:  
‘Now every legislative restriction means . . . a simple man of the people earning a scanty 
livelihood by hard toil, shall be liable to fine or imprisonment for doing that which he and his 
fathers before him have, up to this time, been free to do. If the general interest clearly requires 
that this burden should be put on the fisherman—well and good. But if it does not—if indeed 
there is any doubt upon the matter—I think the man who has made the unnecessary law 
deserves a heavier punishment than the man who breaks it.’53 
Moreover, the perpetuation of public rights to fish was wholly consistent with a more expansive 
fishing effort on the high seas and, indeed, off the coasts of other countries.    
 Political demands aside, as noted above, a number cases preceding Malcomson assert or 
imply the existence of a public right of fishing.  Most such cases dealt with navigable rivers, 
rather than the sea, but several held that the public nature of fishing rights on such rivers is the 
same as that on the open sea.  The earliest noted appears to be the Case of the Royal fishery of the 
river Bann in Ireland (1610) which concerned fisheries in the tidal waters of a river.54  Here the 
Court confirmed the pre-existing nature of Crown rights in the soil and fishery of a river, which 
could be granted to riparian landowners.  It may be noted that the approach of the court in this 
and other cases was that the right was deemed to exist before the dispute in law, rather than 
emerge as a remedy of the court.  Thus, in Lord Fitzwalter's case (1673), the right is implicitly 
accepted in the court’s reasoning about the existence of a burden on a person claiming an 
exclusive right in a tidal river.55  In Warren v. Matthews (1703), Sir John Holt held that every 
subject of the common right may fish with lawful nets in a navigable river as well as in the sea.56  
Moreover, the court held that the Crown cannot bar such a right by the grant of a private fishery.  
However, this position is somewhat misleading since in the same case the court sought to allow 
such a title to be tested and it runs counter to the general line of other authorities, which accept 
exclusive fishing rights by way of ancient grant or usage.57  In Ward v. Cresswell (1741), as 
quoted in the later case of Bagott v. Orr, the Court held that ‘all the subjects of England of 
common right might fish in the sea; it being for the good of the commonwealth, and for the 
sustenance of all the people of the realm’.58  In Carter v. Murcot (1768), the public right was 
again implicit in the need for the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing the existence of a 
                                                   
53 Ibid., p. 4.  For the original see The Fisheries Exhibition Literature (London, William Clowes and Son Ltd, 
1884), vol. 4, p. 18. 
54 (1610) Dav. Rep. 55; Salk. 137 
55 (1673) 1 Mod. 106. (1673) 84 ER 766. 
56 (1703) 6 Mod. 73, (1703) 87 ER 831. 
57 This point was explicitly reviewed by the US Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, (1842) 41 US 
367, 425. 
58 (1741) Willes' Rep. 265.  
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several fishery on a tidal river.59   Mayor of Orford v. Richardson (1791) implicitly confirms the 
right to fish, although the Court was focused mainly on the procedural aspects of how public and 
private claims are presented.60  One of the most important cases was Bagott v. Orr (1801), 
which concerned the prima facie right to take fish between the high- and low-water mark and it 
is one of the few cases to actually articulate upon the nature of the right.61  As the court stated: 
‘The right of fishing in the sea is acknowledged by all nations; it is universal, and part of the law 
of nations’.62  Interestingly, the court was able to draw upon the now generally accepted 
authority of international law, and general agreement about the freedom to fish on the high 
seas, to justify a matter of domestic law.  This seems to draw upon the idea advanced by Grotius 
that the seas are inexhaustible in their nature and cannot be improved upon by subjecting them 
to exclusive rights.  The court also explicitly drew upon the authorities of Bracton and Hale, and 
shows the growing influence of doctrine in the development of the principle of a public right to 
fish.  Soon afterwards, Rogers and Other v. Allen (1808) restated, indirectly, the common right of 
the King’s subjects to fish in the sea, and noted that any grant of a several fishery must be one 
that dated back to the time of Henry II.63  Again, Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell (1826) confirms 
that a franchised fishery could not be established after the Magna Carta.64  Although this 
appears to suggest a reasonably coherent basis in law for the decision in Malcomson, the 
restrictions of the Magna Carta were not restated in all cases.65  However, these exceptional 
cases seem to be instances of limited reasoning, rather than any explicit acknowledgement that 
there exists a general right to grant several fisheries in tidal waters.   
 Since Malcomson, the public right to fish has been carefully observed by the courts, 
although it has been little developed, and most of the case law on fisheries in tidal waters has 
been notoriously deficient in its discussion of this point.  Indeed, there appears to be a degree of 
retrenchment from the high point of Malcomson.  In Neill v. Duke of Devonshire, there is an 
indication that the decision in Malcomson was not being properly understood.66 Thus Lord 
Blackburn stressed that ‘[i]t is not law, and this can never be too often repeated, that the Crown 
cannot grant a several fishery in tidal waters since Magna Carta. Such a statement is illusory and 
contrary to law.”67  Such a fishery could have been created if the fishery existed prior to the 
Charter.  Furthermore, the court was carefully to uphold the core ratio of Malcomson, that ‘no 
                                                   
59 (1768) 4 Burr. 2163, (1768) 98 ER 127. 
60 (1791) 4 TR 438; (1791) 100 ER 1106. 
61 (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 472; (1801) 126 ER 1391. 
62 Ibid, at 1393, citing Hugo Grotius. 
63 (1808) 1 Camp. 309; (1808) 170 ER 967. (citing Ward v. Cresswell and Bagott v Orr).   
64 (1826) 5 B. & C. 875; 108 ER 325. 
65 See for example, Lord Fitzwalter’s case, above note 55; Warren v. Matthews above note 56; Carter v. 
Murcot, above note 59. 
66 Above note 39. 
67 Ibid., at p. 180. 
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new exclusive fishery could be created by royal grant, though all fisheries were left untouched 
which were made several to the exclusion of the public not later than the time of legal 
memory’.68  Lord Blackburn cited Hale with approval to show that although the King exercised 
ownership rights over the seas, the public also enjoyed a ‘public common of piscary’ that could 
not be excluded unless a long-standing private right of fishing had been enjoyed.69  The court 
then went on to state those circumstances in which evidence of a private fishery could be 
adduced. 
 Other relevant cases include R.v. Stimpson (1863), which held that a right of fishing in a 
tidal navigable river is prima facie public.70  In Murphy v. Ryan (1868), the court stated the right 
to be limited to the tidal parts of rivers.  It did not apply to non-tidal parts of the river.71  The 
court in Bloomfield v. Johnston (1868) denied the right’s application to Loch Erne because it was 
not tidal.72  Interestingly, Mayor and Corporation of Carlisle v. Graham and another (1869) 
confirmed the limitations supposedly introduced by the Magna Carta, but held that when a tidal 
river changes its course, the new channel does not carry with it the several fishery on the old 
channel.73  In Brew v. Haren (1877), Lawson, J. stated that the ‘right of the public to take 
[seaweed] when floating … is as clear as their right to catch fish in the ocean.’74  It thus 
confirmed the public right to fish and extended it to ancillary or related activities.  Despite some 
earlier reservations about the reasoning in Malcomson, Lord Blackburn eventually accepted the 
rule in Malcomson in Goodman and another v. Saltash Corporation (1882).75  
 During the twentieth century the public right of fishing was less frequently the object of 
litigation.  In part this is likely to be the result of the fact that since the mid-19th century the 
commercial exercise of fishing rights was effectively put on a statutory basis.76  Several cases 
reaffirmed the right, including Lord Advocate v. Wemyss (1900),77 Truro v. Rowe (1902),78 Parker 
v. Lord Advocate (1904),79 and Fitzhardinge v. Purcell (1908).80  In 1914, the Privy Council 
provided one of the more detailed modern reviews of the public right in Attorney-General of 
                                                   
68 Ibid., p. 178. 
69 Ibid., p. 177. 
70 (1863) 27 JP 678, 4 B & S 301. 
71 (1868) IR 2 CL 143. ‘But whilst the right of fishing in fresh water rivers in which the soil belongs to the 
riparian owners is thus exclusive, the right of fishing in the sea, its arms and estuaries, and in its tidal 
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74 (1877) 11 IR CL 198. 
75 (1882) 7 App. Cas. 633; [1881-1885] All ER Rep 1076, at 1085. 
76 See especially, the Sea Fisheries Act 1843 and the Sea Fisheries Act 1868. 
77 [1900] AC 48. 
78 [1902] 2 KB 709. 
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British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada.81 Viscount Haldane noted that ‘the legal character 
of this right is not easy to define. It is probably a right enjoyed so far as the high seas are 
concerned by common practice from time immemorial, and it was probably in very early times 
extended by the subject without challenge to the foreshore and tidal waters which were 
continuous with the ocean, if, indeed, it did not in fact first take rise in them’.82   Haldane 
compared the right to fish to the right of navigation, noting that the Crown regarded itself as 
‘parens patri’, responsible for protecting the rights of the nation.83  From this the Crown’s 
protective role evolved into an enforceable right for subjects of the Crown.    
 In Stephens v. Snell (1939), one of the few cases dealing with the enforcement of 
exclusive rights against the public right of fishing, the plaintiff succeeded in a case against a 
fisherman for trespass on his several fishery in the tidal waters of Axmouth harbour.84.  Judicial 
consideration of the issue then lapsed for a long while until the public right of fishing was 
strongly reaffirmed by the High Court in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council (1993).85  In the 
context of justifying the extension of the rights to the matter of digging bait, the court stated: 
‘We base our decision, however, on wider grounds. Many of the authorities show that  the 
underlying reasons for the public rights to navigate and to fish were economic. Sea fishing from 
boats or from the land was a vital source of food for many coastal communities. The public right 
to take fish from the sea and tidal waters was jealously guarded from Magna Carta onwards.’86  
An equally firm approach to protecting public rights was upheld in Adair v. National Trust 
(1998), when Girvin, J. stated that at ‘common law there is a public right to take fish from the 
tidal waters around the Kingdom. The common law right extends to the tidal reaches of all 
rivers and estuaries and in the sea and arms of the sea within the territorial limits of the 
Kingdom.’87 The position in Malcomson was accepted without hesitation. More recently the right 
was acknowledged in Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v. NV Royale Belge (2000),88 and Isle of Anglesey County 
Council v. Welsh Ministers and others (2009).89  In the former, the question arose as to whether 
or not an interference with a public right of fishing constituted a public nuisance.  The court 
restated the simple extent of the right as a ‘right to fish in tidal waters is a right to take fish, 
including shellfish, by whatever means are considered effective, subject to any statutory 
restrictions’.  Interestingly, the High Court held that interference with such a right is capable of 
                                                   
81 [1914] AC 153, at pp. 168-71.  The existence of the right was later reaffirmed in Attorney-General for 
Canada v. Attorney General for British Columbia and other [1930] AC 111. 
82 Attorney-General of British Columbia [1914], ibid., at p. 169. 
83 Ibid. 
84 [1939] 3 ALL ER 622. 
85 Above note 42. 
86 Ibid., 624. 
87 Adair v. National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty and another [1998] NI 33. 
88 [2000] All ER 1148, at para. 69. 
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constituting a public nuisance.90  In the latter case, the court also accepted the existence of the 
right, and indicated that a landowner could not ‘carry out works which “substantially 
interfered” with the public's fishery rights’.91  However, the precise extent of this was not 
developed any further. 
 The attempt to tie the public right of fishing to the Magna Carta appears to be an 
example of judicial law-making and it is doubtful that this can be sustained.  At the very least it 
is a case of the court reading a political intention into a law far beyond what the text is capable 
of supporting alone.  However, the right can be traced back in the common law at least as far 
back as 1610, and may have received earlier judicial recognition.  Regardless of any concerns 
about the basis of the rule in Malcomson, it has since been accepted as good law.  As Viscount 
Haldane stated in Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada: ‘Since the 
decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v. O'Dea, it has been unquestioned law that since 
Magna Charta no new exclusive fishery could be created by Royal grant in tidal waters, and that 
no public right of fishing in such waters, then existing, can be taken away without competent 
legislation’.92  In light of this general proposition, the issue is not so much the existence of a 
general public right to fish, but rather whether this has been lawfully restricted in any particular 
area, and the extent to which it can be varied, lost or regulated.  There appears to be evidence in 
the Domesday Book of many exclusive tidal fisheries.  However, the true extent of these is 
difficult to gauge.  The fisheries were not delimited, and may refer to fishing by more limited 
means, rather than be evidence of a widely drawn private right.93  Hall considers such grants to 
be rare, and limited to those places capable of sustaining exclusive possession.94  This seems to 
imply that such private fisheries were closely connected to the holder’s capacity to exercise 
some degree of practical exclusion of others from the fishing ground.  They also appear to be 
limited to estuaries and waters around certain towns.95  There is little evidence of such rights 
extending to tidal waters at a distance from the shore.  However, this does raise interesting 
questions about the relationship between the public right to fish and the freedom to fish on the 
high seas.   
 
 
The Nature of the Public Right to Fish 
 
                                                   
90 Above note 88, para 69 
91 Above note 89, para 68. 
92 [1914] AC 153, at 170. 
93 See Moore and Moore above note 11, p. 4. 
94 Above note 14, p. 5. 
95 See for example. Henry Blake and Johyn Goodman, the Younger v. The Mayor and free Burgesses of the 
Borough of Saltash, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 633. 
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General acceptance of the right and its material extent 
 
As discussed above, there is legal recognition, and a general acceptance among expert 
commentators as to the existence, of the public right to fish.96  Unfortunately, this is often 
considered in short measure.  In 1875, Hall described the 'public or general right of fishing in 
the sea' as 'a beneficial privilege enjoyed by British subjects since time out of mind'.97  He goes 
on to state that the precise origins, whether a reservation by the people of a right, or the public 
grant from the King, are immaterial.98  It is suggested that the nature of the original right is 
linked to the scope of the right.    In this context one general theme is important – the link 
between ownership of land and fishing rights on superadjacent waters.  It appears that the right 
to fish was originally regarded as deriving from ownership of the soil over which the water 
flowed.99  Property rights attached to land, certainly in the feudal tradition, and interests in the 
water over land were ancillary to this.  Indeed, the general position in respect of fisheries under 
the common law is to regard them, prima facie, as profits.  There is a presumption that the 
owner of the soil (land) retains ownership of the fishery in the water above the soil.  The 
treatment of fisheries as an incident of land ownership continues.  Thus Halsbury’s indicates 
that rights to swimming fish pass with the land and are ‘an incident of the ownership of the 
soil’.100  If this holds true, then the public right to fish may be limited by the extent to which 
ownership of land, or the seabed, was conceived.  As noted below, this indicates that it was, at 
least originally, confined to a small margin of coastal waters.    Another point to note is that 
evidence may be adduced of the grant of the right to the fishery separate from ownership of the 
soil.101  Like other forms of property, it is not uncommon to find varying incidents of ownership 
vested in different persons, to varying degrees. 
As a common law institution, the public right to fish developed piecemeal.102  This makes 
it difficult to ascertain a single coherent or principled statement of the nature of the right.  We 
can survey various cases and draw out aspects of the right.  To start with, the right clearly 
permits fishing from boats, and this is distinct from the public right of navigation.103 It is not 
limited to mere fishing, but includes necessary ancillary rights.  An incident of the public right to 
fish is the right to use the sea shore for purposes essential to the enjoyment of the right of 
                                                   
96 This is discussed in more detail by Moore and Moore, above note 11, chap. XIX. 
97 Above note 14, p. 46. 
98 Ibid. 
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fishery.104  This is confirmed in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council, where it was held to extend 
to ancillary rights, such as the right to cross the foreshore in order to exercise the right.105  The 
same case also confirmed that it included the right to collect bait from the foreshore as would be 
necessary to facilitate the public right of fishing. 
A second observation is that regardless of judicial accounts of the nature and scope of 
the right, there are now in place many more modern restrictions on the right than were 
articulated during its early development. These are predominantly set out in legislation, for it 
remains within the authority of Parliament to legislate such matters as it sees fit.  Of course, this 
may be subject to certain limitations on the authority of Parliament.106  The public right to fish 
under the common law developed at a time when fisheries were not threatened by depletion, 
and there was less concern with protection of the environment.  Such matters are not fully 
accounted for in the common law right.  However, as Girvin J. noted in Adair, the common law 
right is so entrenched that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to regulate the common law 
right.107 This has been done through various fisheries legislative provisions.108  Such legislation 
is quite extensive, and it goes beyond the scope of this report to detail such legislative controls 
on sea fisheries.  It may also be noted that Parliament may grant exclusive fisheries in tidal 
waters.109  This much is now entrenched in statute, as per section 1 (3) of the Sea Fishery 
(Shellfish) Act 1967. 
A final point to note here is that it is not perfectly clear whether the public right of 
fishing is a right or a liberty.  A liberty (or privilege) is normally understood as meaning that a 
person is free to do something, whereas a right is usually conceived of as a claim against 
another person.  In the case law, both terms are used to describe public fishing.110 However, a 
preponderance of the cases indicates that the public right of fishing is more closely aligned with 
a liberty or privilege.  Thus most cases have concerned the use of the public right as a defence 
against interference with the pre-existing liberty.  There are no examples of the right being 
exercised in a way that requires other persons to do something positive to ensure the exercise 
of the right.  As such the use of the term ‘right’ seems to be a more limited acknowledgement of 
the fact that it is a legally recognised entitlement. 
                                                   
104 Hall, above note 14, pp. 48-9. 
105 Above note 42, at 621. 
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Holders of the Public Right to Fish 
 
Common law authorities indicate the right vests in the ‘public’ or in subjects of the crown.  Thus 
the right can be exercised by individuals qua members of the public.  There is nothing in 
principle limiting its exercise by individuals in a commercial context.  In Anderson, the right to 
collect bait, which is ancillary to the right to fish, was limited to bait digging to facilitate fishing; 
but it was not permitted for commercial sale.111  However, the limitation in this case only 
extends to ancillary rights, and not to the right to fish itself.  Historically, the public right to fish 
appears to be limited to British nationals, although this does not appear to have been tested in 
court.  This is linked to the political motivation surrounding the extension of exclusive control 
over fishing in coastal waters, rather than operating as some form of right enjoyed exclusively 
by nationals.  There is no evidence to suggest that fishermen of any nationality could not fish in 
coastal waters so long as they were fishing from Britain, rather than fishing as distant-water 
fleets.  Wisdom indicates that a foreign fishing vessel would be entitled to fish in British waters 
so long as it complies with any statutory permission to do so.112  The most significant 
entitlement to fish is afforded to vessels of other Member States of the European Union under 
the common fisheries policy.    In most cases, the right has been asserted by individuals and 
used to challenge claims of exclusive fisheries.  In practice there would seem to be little point in 
limiting the right, as exercised for recreational purposes, to purely British nationals given the 
practical problem of controlling diffuse small-scale low-impact fishing. 
For commercial fishing purposes, it is important to note that the common law has long 
since been overtaken by statutory regulation.  Legislation does not generally remove the right, 
but determines how and when it can be exercised.  This may limit the exercise of fishing rights 
in practice considerably.  However, apart from instances of several rights being created in shell 
fisheries, such regulations have generally been limited to setting conditions for the exercise of 
fishing rights, such as the use of particular gear, or fishing seasons.  It is crucial to understand 
that there is nothing that limits the right of the government to regulate fishing activities.  Of 
course, questions remain as to whether regulations that effectively reduced fishing to exclusive 
private property would be permitted, and if so under what circumstances it would be deemed to 
be either politically or legally permissible. 
 
The Nature of the Crown’s Responsibilities. 
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It is clear that the Crown originally exercised ownership rights over coastal waters, and this 
extended to the fish, as profits thereof.  Some writers have argued that the Crown’s original 
position of ownership has developed into a form of trusteeship.  Thus Farnham notes that the 
King would have had neither the time nor the inclination to exploit the fish for his own benefit, 
nor prevent his subjects fishing as they needed.113  This and subsequent efforts to limit the 
power of the Crown resulted in the formulation of the idea that the Crown held the rights to fish 
in trust for the people.114  However, there is no explicit basis for this ‘doctrine of trust’ and in the 
Case of the Royal Fishery of the Banne, the court explicitly refused to deal with a fishery at the 
King’s pleasure in such a way.115  Farnham accepted that the trust doctrine did not emerge until 
after the deposition of Charles I.  However, quite how the Crown’s right to deal freely with 
fisheries that it owned became limited is unclear.  American law, in contrast to English law, 
developed the public trust doctrine to accommodate this tension between ownership of 
resources and public rights.116  Such an approach is peculiar to US jurisprudence and did not 
evolve in the English common law.  Viscount Haldane, in the AG of British Columbia, indicated 
that the Crown acted as ‘parens patri’ in order to protect the interests of persons engaged in 
fisheries.117  This form of protection then evolved into a legal right.  All that appears to remain is 
a responsibility of the state, either by way of legislative control, or judicial protection, to ensure 
that the public right of fishing is not unreasonably fettered, or infringed by unfounded private 
claims to exclusive fishing in tidal waters.   
 
Geographic Scope of the Public Right to Fish 
 
The geographic scope of the public right to fish requires careful consideration because the 
spatial jurisdiction or sovereignty of the State has evolved since the earliest times when any 
public right was asserted.  The general position is that the public have a ‘liberty of fishing in the 
sea and the creeks or arms thereof’.118  This includes fishing upon the foreshore between the 
high- and low-water mark, as well as the taking of shellfish,119  so long as these have not been 
reduced to the possession of another by cultivation.120   The extent of fishing on creeks or arms 
of the sea has been much discussed.  In general the right is limited to the tidal part of a river.121 
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The preferred extent of tidal waters is where the water flows and reflows.122 This means that 
the precise limits of the tidal part of a river is a question of fact 
Historically speaking, the seaward extent of the public right of fishing is not clearly 
stated in the common law.  All that can be inferred is that it was linked to the extent of the 
Crown’s ownership of the sea around the coast of England.  This can be traced back to the 
writings of Thomas Digges (1589) 123 and was strongly maintained by English jurists.124  A 
central role can be attributed to John Selden’s highly influential text, Mare Clausum (1635), 
which sought to justify King Charles I’s ownership of the British Seas.125  Such ownership 
extended to the water and the seabed, and all things therein.126  This posited ownership of fish 
in the Crown and there is evidence to support the Crown treating the sea and fisheries as 
property.  The Crown’s right of property in territorial waters was reaffirmed in the important 
cases of Gammell v. Commissioners of Woods and Forests (1859)127 and the Whitstable Fisheries 
case (1864).128  Unfortunately, the precise extent of the Crown’s sovereignty or ownership is not 
made clear in these cases.  Thus, in the Whitstable Fisheries case, this is stated to be the assumed 
distance of a cannon-shot from the shore.129  There are indications that this might have been 
regarded as more extensive and subject only to the extent that the King could control.  Indeed, 
in Attorney-General for British Columbia, Viscount Haldane considered it was clear that Lord 
Hale meant to include in the dominion of the Crown something much wider even than this (i.e., 
3-mile limit).130  However, there was little consideration of such matters in the common law 
prior to the nineteenth century.  As indicated above, most disputes related to conflicts between 
public fishing rights and claims of excusive fisheries, and the latter were limited to coastal 
waters near to shore and to arms of the sea.  Beyond coastal waters it was clear the freedom of 
the high seas prevailed and so there was no need to assert some form of public right to fish 
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derived from Crown ownership of the seas.  It may also be noted that international assertions to 
wider maritime dominion had lapsed before many fisheries cases came before the courts, and 
there was little concern with the extent of the Crown’s rights of ownership in the seas until the 
nineteenth century.  
R. v. Keyn (1876) is taken to be authority that the common law did not extend beyond 
the low-water mark.131  However, this case concerned the assertion of criminal jurisdiction, and 
it is doubtful that it in any way limited other common law doctrines, particularly the public right 
to fish.  Since this time, the nature of the Crown’s rights in the territorial sea ceased to be 
couched in terms of ownership, but rather in terms of sovereignty, as this became the accepted 
juridical nature of the territorial sea.  This does not, however, restrict the Crown’s assumed 
proprietary interests in the waters or seabed of the territorial sea under the common law.132 
 It is generally accepted that the domestic limits of the territorial sea must accord with 
international law.  As is well known by students of the history of the law of the sea, the breadth 
of the territorial sea was long a matter of controversy and variation in practice between States.  
Until the mid-18th century the existence and limit of territorial waters was heavily debated by 
scholars.  In 1744, Bynkershoek formulated the cannon-shot rule, which asserted that exclusive 
control over coastal waters extended as far as could be defended by the shot of a cannon.133  At 
the same time Scandinavian States asserted exclusive control over a belt of waters extending to 
approximately 1 league.  It was not until the late 18th century that these discrete limits coalesced 
in a more uniform limit of 3 nm.  This limit was generally adhered to by maritime powers, 
including the United Kingdom, but never formally agreed or accepted by all States as a general 
rule of international law.  This position continued until the LOSC set the limit of the territorial 
sea at 12 nm.134  
 As a result of the uncertainty in the common law, the seaward limit of the public right to 
fish has since been set by statute.  The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1887 assumed a 
seaward limit of 3 nm.  However, the Act did not actually delimit the territorial sea at 3 nm; 
section 7 merely refers to waters ‘deemed by international law to be within the territorial 
sovereignty of Her Majesty’.  To the extent that international law could be said to limit the 
territorial sea to 3 nm, then this might have fixed the limits of the territorial sea.135  This was not 
a particularly clear example of legislative drafting.  Despite this, the actual limit was not 
adjusted until 1987, when the territorial sea was extended to 12 nm for waters around the 
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UK.136  Even now some anomalies remain.  For example, the 1987 Act provides that unless 
provided for by an Order in Council, this does not apply to the Channel Islands.  Unlike Jersey, 
which was subject to an Order extending its territorial sea, the territorial sea around Guernsey 
remains limited, as a matter of domestic law, to 3 nm.  This has since given rise to disputes 
concerning the state’s authority to regulate fisheries within what are normally considered to be 
territorial waters.137 
 Historically, there has been an important distinction between territorial waters and the 
high seas.  Within territorial waters, foreign nationals enjoy no rights to fish.  Thus the public 
right of fishing is enjoyed by nationals within territorial waters, subject to any limits resulting 
from the grant of exclusive fisheries.  On the high seas, nationals of all States enjoy the right to 
fish on the high seas. The right is granted to States and may be exercised by their nationals, 
subject to limits on the State’s rights.138  Such limits include treaty obligations, general duties to 
conserve and manage living resources, and to cooperate with regard to conservation and 
management.  There is also a duty to have due regard to other users of the high seas.  The high 
seas are generally defined as those areas beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State.  
Initially this pertained to areas beyond the territorial sea, however far this stretched.  However, 
under the LOSC, the high seas are now limited to waters beyond 200 nm since States may claim 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).139  Within this zone States enjoy sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting living resources.  This allows States to limit fishing 
opportunities to their nationals within the 200-nm EEZ. 
 It has not been confirmed whether the seaward extent of the public right to fish under 
the common law has kept pace with the limits of the territorial sea under international law or 
indeed the EEZ or equivalent fisheries zone.  There is some support for the view that the public 
right to fish is co-extensive with the territorial sea.  The Australian High Court in Commonwealth 
v. Yarmirr accepted that the common law followed Australia’s extended jurisdiction from 3 to 
12 nm.140  From this it might be presumed that if the public right to fish is derived from the 
Crown’s ownership of the soil, then the right to fish will be coextensive with the geographic 
extent of the Crown’s ownership rights.  Until the mid-19th century these were not restricted as 
to their seaward extent.  For a period from 1887 until 1987, the territorial sea was prima facie 
limited to 3 nm, and it would appear reasonable to assume that the public right to fish was also 
so limited.  Beyond 3 nm, there remained the freedom to fish on the high seas, which rendered 
the need to argue a public right moot.  It seems inconceivable that a vacuum in fishing 
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opportunities was intended to result from the extension of the territorial sea to 12 nm without 
any commensurate extension in public fishing rights to the same extent.  For this reason it 
seems sensible to hold that since 1987, the public right to fish has at least been extended to 12 
nm, co-extensive with the UK territorial sea.  In principle, there seems no reason why this 
entitlement does not also extend to waters forming part of any exclusive fisheries zone. 
  
Limitations on the Right 
 
The public right of fishing is not an absolute right.  Thus it may be subject to regulation and 
limitation by the State.  As a matter of principle this is quite reasonable.  Any liberty if used to 
the absolute degree will be destructive of, or harmful to, the liberty of other persons.  More 
specifically, the unrestricted use of a public right to fish may result in the destruction of the 
fishery.141  Capturing this view, the court stated in Lord Leconfield and others v. Lord Lonsdale 
that ‘[i]n the sea and tidal parts of rivers the public have the right of catching all the fish they 
can by all means which are not inconsistent with the equal rights of each other’.142  Although 
this was an obiter remark, it is consistent with the nature of an entitlement held by the public at 
large.  The common law might be viewed as placing some specific limits on fishing, such as 
limiting the quantity of fish that may be appropriated, gear to be used and times of fishing.  For 
example in Warren v. Matthews, the court refers to ‘lawful nets’ as a constraint on fishing.  
However, the fact is that any general requirement of reasonable use, or any specific form of use 
limitation under the common law, will have been long since surpassed by statutory controls. 
Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Moore and Moore noted that the public right to fish 
must be exercised reasonably, and with respect to any applicable statutes.143  A final point to 
note here is that although such rules do not destroy the public right to fish, they do articulate 
how the right is to be exercised.   
 
Establishing a Claim to a Private Fishery 
 
Given that one of the most significant limitations on the public right of fishing is the existence of 
a private or several fishery, it is helpful to consider how this can be established under the 
common law, and when this will be deemed to exclude the public right.  A line of authorities 
indicates that a person seeking to establish the existence of an exclusive fishing right has the 
burden of proof.  In Lord Fitzwalter’s case,144 Hale CJ held that a person claiming a free fishery, 
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several fishery, or commons of fishery, must provide evidence that he has the claimed right of 
fishing.  Thus the burden is on the party showing the public right of fishery has been removed.  
This position is asserted in Carter v. Murcot.  ‘If any one claims it exclusively, he must show a 
right. If he can show a right by prescription, he may then exercise an exclusive right, though the 
presumption is against him, unless he can prove such a prescriptive right.’ This would require 
them to show on the balance of probabilities that the right exists.  As noted above, this can be 
done by establishing evidence of title going back to before 1215.  A second option is to establish, 
as per Malcomson, evidence of long-standing use.  This is important, as the courts have been 
prepared to accept such evidence to establish an exclusive fishery.  In Loose v. Castleton, the 
Court of Appeal held that once evidence was adduced of a long-standing usage, the burden then 
falls upon the party claiming a public right to show that the origin of the fishery is in fact 
modern, i.e., dating from 1189.145 
 Mere evidence of title, ‘a paper title’, is not sufficient to establish a private right of 
fishing.  The common law also requires ‘possession’, or rather evidence of acts of ownership.146  
The quality of such acts depends on the circumstances.  For example, proof of ownership of a 
fishing weir, or other means of taking fish, may be evidence of ownership of the entire fishery.147  
Acts such as the fixing of stakes, building of piers or boathouses, taking of gravel, and other 
cultivating activities have been accepted as evidence of ownership of the soil, and hence the 
right of an exclusive fishery.148  Of the forms of evidence, Moore and Moore indicate that 
evidence of netting is most important, as this was the most common form of taking fish.149  Such 
acts have generally been limited to tidal waters immediately adjacent to the coast.  This is 
because it is simply impractical to manifest long-standing acts of ownership at a distance from 
the shore.  Absent any evidence of title and acts of ownership, the public right of fishing must be 
deemed to exist. 
 
The Effect of Establishing a Private Right 
 
Once title to fish in tidal waters has been lawfully and conclusively established, then no fishing 
by the public can displace the right.150  Interruption of a several fishery does not destroy the 
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right vested in the holder.151  Normally, long evidence of use is allowed to support a claim that a 
right by prescription exists.  However, evidence of use does not displace a prescriptive right that 
is also supported by written title and evidence of possession.152  Thus Moore and Moore 
conclude that ‘once a several fishery always a several fishery.153  This is based upon the idea that 
any fishing in an area subject to a several fishery is either by express or implied permission 
from the owner.  Once a public right has been excluded, then it cannot be regained.  Of course, 
this ignores the possibility of the Crown reacquiring the several fishery and then reverting it 
back to a general public use.  Evidence of such an acquisition and reversion would need to be 
established and no examples of this being done have been found.  One exception to this may be 
in the case where title to a several fishery has not been conclusively established, in which case 
the long-standing evidence of a public right of fishing may be used to dispute the existence of 
any such title.154  One should also distinguish a general public right of fishing from a right 
enjoyed by a more limited class of persons.  Such a right might be confused with a general public 
right to fish.  For example, inhabitants of towns or parishes have asserted rights to take fish in 
fisheries owned by public bodies.  Such rights to take fish have been difficult to establish, but in 
the case of Goodman v. The Mayor of Saltash, the House of Lords recognised that although the 
corporation held a several fishery, this was not an absolute or unqualified title for their sole 
benefit, but one held in trust for the benefit of inhabitants of the borough as shown by their 
usage.155  Thus inhabitants of the borough might fish in the area, but not the wider public. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
A public right to fish in British waters exists for British vessels.  This right emerged under the 
common law and precedes much public regulation of fisheries.  As such, it might be viewed as 
supporting a presumption that fishing is permitted unless specifically restricted.  Its origins in 
law can be traced back with some certainty to 1610 and the River Bann fishery case, and it has 
been considered in numerous cases since, most recently being confirmed in Isle of Anglesey 
County Council v. Welsh Ministers and others (2009).  In 1863, in the case of Malcomson v. O’Dea, 
the House of Lords confirmed the right to have existed since the Magna Carta (1215).  Although 
this seems to be a legal fiction, it has since been generally accepted by judges and 
commentators. 
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 The public right to fish exists in coastal waters extending to 12 nm and probably as far 
as the outer limits of an exclusive fisheries zone.  It includes tidal waters and arms of the sea.  It 
exists unless it can be established that a private fishery was granted prior to the Magna Carta or 
evidence of long-standing use since then can be adduced.  The right is held by individuals as 
members of the public, although the category of persons is untested.  It extends to all fishing 
types and techniques in the territorial sea.  It includes fishing from boats, and allows for certain 
ancillary rights such as bait digging and permits access to the foreshore to facilitate fishing.  It 
may be restricted by legislation.  This has frequently been done under the various Sea Fisheries 
Acts, and associated delegated legislation.  It is also subject to a “reasonable use” requirement 
under the common law.  There is a general responsibility on the State not to unreasonably fetter 
the right.   
If the general position is that  a general right to fish exists, subject to any licensing or 
regulatory limitation deemed necessary to ensure the proper conservation and management of 
the fisheries, then this raises at least one question: could such a public right be used to challenge 
fisheries legislation in general?  The lack of such challenges in the past suggests that this is 
unlikely.  However, the absence of challenge might simply be because fisheries legislation has 
not so far fundamentally challenged the existence of a public right to fish.  Also, it is probably 
undesirable that a general liberty to fish could be used to challenge statutory rules that properly 
seek to limit fishing effort in order to ensure sustainable fishing.  That said, at the time of 
writing, there is much interest in the use of rights-based fishing mechanisms, and these present 
a different order of change to fishing entitlements.  These can significantly alter the nature of 
fisheries because they can result in permanent and exclusive rights being vested in a limited 
category of persons.  As the experience of Iceland shows, unless such measures are strongly 
justified in terms of conservation and management needs, then they are vulnerable to challenge 
by fishing interests that have been disenfranchised.  If nothing else, this cautions a degree of 
sensitivity in the design of fisheries regimes, especially those that may limit public entitlements. 
 
 
  1 
Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many fisheries around the world have been subject to significant reform or are undergoing 
major review.  Such reform will seriously impact upon existing patterns of entitlement and 
regulation.  This in turn is likely to generate resistance to change and, in some cases, legal 
challenge.  At a time when the use of rights based entitlements to regulate fisheries are 
receiving serious attention, there is growing interest in seeking out means of challenging what 
is perceived to be the privatisation of a public good.1  The present paper reflects upon some 
historical aspects of fishing rights under the common law and considers how this may limit or 
influence future changes in the regulation of fisheries.  In particular, it is concerned with the so-
called public right to fish within the common law.  In broad terms the public right to fish right 
describes a form of entitlement to fish that cannot be removed by the Crown.  It is thus 
suggestive of certain limits on the regulatory authority of the government to use certain 
instruments such as private property rights to regulate marine fisheries.  More generally it 
might seem to embody the idea that the resource is reserved for use in the wider public good or 
is reserved to ensure that certain public needs can be met. 
This may seem to be a rather restricted field of enquiry, but it should be remembered 
that the English common law underpins many legal systems around the world.  Moreover, the 
specific notion of public right to fish has manifested itself repeatedly in institutions within 
common law legal systems, such as the public trust doctrine in US jurisprudence and fisheries 
law in Australia.  This suggest that an understanding of the public right to fishing under the 
common law is not or mere limited concern to students of English legal history.  Moreover, it is 
also clear that in any legal system, the baseline legal status of fishing rights may impact upon 
subsequent legal developments.  Take for example, the recent resort to human rights law, as 
illustrated by the recent Human Rights Committee ruling against Iceland.  All exploitable marine 
fish stocks to the limit of Iceland’s 200nm exclusive fishing zone are the common property of 
the Icelandic nation.2  This means that fisheries have an important public function.  Since 1975, 
many fisheries have been subject to rights-based management as individual quotas were 
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introduced into the herring fishery.3  This shift in regulatory focus has not been without its 
difficulties and there have been numerous challenges to both the system and particular 
allocation of quotas.4  This came to international prominence in 2007, when the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee ruled on the legality of aspects of the Iceland’s fisheries management 
regime.5  In 2001 two fishermen, Erlingur Sveinn Haraldsson and Orn Snaevar Sveinsson, 
challenged the quota system after they purchased a boat but were unable to obtain a fishing 
quota.  Although they could lease a quota, this was at such a high rate as to make fishing wholly 
unprofitable.  They decided to fish without a quota and challenge the ITQ system in the Icelandic 
courts.  After the Icelandic Supreme Court ruled that the quota system was constitutional, they 
filed a claim with the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC).  Much of the issue turned 
on whether the introduction of privately held quotas was in the public good.  For example, 
Iceland argued and the authors of the complaint accepted that measures to limit over fishing 
were necessary, and that the public interest required restrictions on the freedom of individuals 
to engage in commercial fishing.6  However, it was also asserted that such restrictions should be 
of a general nature, reasonable and that all persons meeting such requirement should have an 
equal chance of access to quotas.  Although not fully reasoned, the HRC ruled that ‘the property 
entitlement privilege accorded permanently to the original quota owners, to the detriment of 
the authors, is not based on reasonable grounds.’ 7 Furthermore, Iceland is ‘under an obligation 
to provide the authors with an effective remedy, including adequate compensation and review 
of its fisheries management system’. 8  It is not clear how far reaching the decision of the HRC 
will be, but it seems that some reform of the fisheries management regime will be required to 
ensure Iceland’s compliance with general human rights obligations.  The case shows how much 
legal context matters, and also how the previously public character of a resource imposed 
certain limits on the subsequent regulatory shape of entitlements.  
The paper is divided into four sections.  In the first part, some brief observations are 
made on the importance of historical ideas in the process of legal change.  In the second part, the 
treatment of the legal nature of fishing rights by leading commentators is briefly considered.  
This is then examined in light of its treatment in the common law.  In part four, the nature and 
extent of this right as it currently operates are examined.  Finally, some brief observations are 
offered on its potential role as a regulatory tool.  However, these are points that will require 
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more careful consideration and merit more detailed treatment that is possible in the present 
paper. 
 
Some Reflections on the Role of Historical Rights 
  
The history of law plays a vital role in the process of law reform.  Of course change may be 
motivated by multiple social, economic and economic reasons, but when it occurs in law, it must 
also be evaluated in light of what is legally permissible and desirable.  So when we seek to 
reform the law, we measure the change against the yardstick of what the law allows and what 
will be deemed to be legally acceptable.  This process of weighing up the possibility and 
desirability of legal change is an incredibly difficult but necessary process.  Law is the product of 
many tensions.  For example, the law of the sea is in part a result of the tension between mare 
liberum and mare clausum, the tensions between coastal state and flag state authority, the 
tensions between inclusive and exclusive claims to oceans use, the tensions between certainty 
and flexibility.  There are many other complex tensions, such as those between commercial and 
environmental concerns, and between development and conservation.  The law of the sea, as a 
process, seeks to mediate between these tensions and to accommodate as far as possible the 
range and quality of interests possessed by the principal actors and subjects involved in oceans 
use.  Law is a dynamic process that evolves to meet new challenges presented by changing 
knowledge and circumstance.  This process is massively complex, having evolved over hundreds 
of years to meet innumerable circumstances.  For the student of the law of the sea, one small 
window into this complexity is to recall the view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC)9 as a package deal, that is to say the product of legal and political negotiations 
that has resulted in a careful balance of the interests between States and groups of States in 
respect of the Conventions substantive rules.10  Of course, the LOSC is merely one, albeit 
significant, part of the law of the sea, which in turn is but one part of general international law, 
which is in turn one dimension of law that continues to operate at regional and domestic levels.  
Legal change may be politically, or socially, or economically, or scientifically driven, but it must 
still occur through legal channels.  As such, the case for or against change will be couched in 
legal terms, at least in part.  The way in which law can produce complex balances of rights and 
responsibilities is well illustrated, even over a short time, by the case of Haraldsson and 
Sveinsson v. Iceland noted above.  
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Just as commentators warn against trying to unpick the LOSC, care must be taken in 
trying to adjust any legal relationship for each legal relationship forms part of a complex array 
of interests that are affected by change.  For example, if a fishing practice is shown to be 
unsustainable, then it may be prohibited or qualified.  This in turn may result in fishing effort 
being channelled into other areas or towards other species.  It may generate political and 
economic pressure to compensate fishermen for lost income.  It may increase pressure on 
welfare mechanisms.  This is to say nothing of the complex impacts that may occur within the 
ecosystem itself.   So far this might seem to read against a caution against change.  It is a 
warning certainly, but perhaps only to heed to risks of careless disregard of legal context.  The 
following review of the public right to fish in the common law explores one strand of legal 
development and indicates the complexity that forms part of the legal  
As might be expected when we begin to explore the Byzantine development of the 
common law, the public right to fish is not a straightforward matter. Indeed, the leading 
commentary on the development of fisheries law in Great Britain, Moore and Moore’s The 
History and Law of Fisheries (1903) begins by nothing that there is considerable confusion in the 
law.11  Misconceptions about facts have arisen and undue weight has been attributed to the 
dicta of ancient writers.  This has resulted in the ‘enunciation of principles very often 
inconsistent with the true facts as to the existence, nature and attribute of fisheries’.12  This is, as 
shown below, particularly the case in respect of the public right to fish.  Furthermore, the 
concepts used to describe public and private fishing rights are not always used consistently.13  
This makes it difficult to plot the precise development and content of the public right to fish.  
Unlike international fisheries, there have been few detailed considerations of fishing rights in 
domestic law.  In 1875, Hall examined some fisheries law as part of his broader treatise on 
rights of the sea shore.14 In 1904, the American writer Henry P. Farnham, provided a quite 
detailed account of fisheries.15  The most recent edition of Wisdom’s Law of Watercourses 
devotes some attention to the nature and extent of the right, although this is necessarily 
succinct as it is merely one aspect of a more general examination of the law relating to 
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watercourses.16  Appleby has been keen to raise awareness of the right, but is concerned that it 
can be used to sustain a culture of overfishing.17 
Despite some complexity or ambiguity in the nature and extent of the public right to fish, 
it is possible to construct some general delineations of the right in the common law and the key 
academic commentaries on fishing rights.  By providing an account of the public right to fish we 
are able to gauge the extent to which potential regulatory change, such as the introduction of 
stronger rights based entitlement in fisheries, can be accommodated within the common law.  
 
 
A Brief Survey of Commentaries on Marine Fisheries in the Common Law 
    
Prior to Moore and Moore, there was no systematic doctrinal analysis of the actual origins and 
development of the public right to fish. The earliest legal authorities tended to ignore marine 
fisheries. Thus Johnston notes that the Romans had little interest in maritime law or fisheries, 
other than as ancillary to assertions of military authority.18  Roman law merely regarded fish as 
ferae naturae which were free to capture by all and this exerted a strong influence on both civil 
and common law doctrines. Under feudal law, authority was derived from ownership of land 
and this could not be applied to the sea.19  This perpetuated a de minimis approach to fisheries 
regulation.  Of course, feudal law did admit private grants of fishery in rivers and limited coastal 
waters, and as the monarchs sought to bestow privileges on favoured subjects, such were 
generally quite limited in marine areas.  This approach was largely consistent with predominant 
natural law doctrines which favoured the equal rights of all men in certain commons. When the 
matter was considered in legal writing, it was briefly done, and usually as part of a wider 
treatise on maritime law or, indeed, the common law in general.  Henry de Bracton, writing his 
treatise on the Laws and Customs of England in the 13th century, merely asserted that the seas 
are common to all as of natural right, and this extends to the right of fishing in ports and 
rivers.20  This seems to be a simple assertion drawn directly from Roman law without other 
authority.  In 1569, Thomas Digges asserted crown’s right of property in the sea and seabed, 
                                                   
16 W. Howarth, Wisdom’s Law of Watercourses 5th ed. (Shaw & Sons, Crayford, 1992), esp. 176-82. 
17 T. Appleby, ‘The public right to fish.  Is it fit for purpose?’ (2005) 16 Water Law 201.  This generated 
some response.  See P. Scott, ‘Another view of the public right to fish – and the question of regulation or 
ownership’ (2008) 19 Water Law 37; T. Appleby, ‘Response to “Another view of the public right to fish – 
and the question of regulation or ownership”’ (2008) 19 Water Law 41. 
18 D.M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 158-9  
19 See P.T. Fenn, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1926), pp. 66-7. 
20 De Legibus et Consuetudinibus (trans. T. Twist)(London, Longman and Co. ), p.57. 
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observing that Kings have suffered fishermen to use the seas under the jure gentium.21   It is 
unclear how far this approach became accepted.  For example, it was rejected by Plowden, a 
leading lawyer, in Sir John Constable’s case, but accepted by Sir John Dee.22   
Taking a broader perspective on maritime authority in general, it may be noted that 
prior to the seventeenth century it was not at all clear that States had the right or desire to claim 
any authority over marine spaces and so guarantee any rights of fishing for their subjects.  
Certainly, as is noted below, there is evidence of claims to public and private fishing rights 
dating back to the early 17th century, but there was little coherence to such claims.23   Later 
decisions seemed assume a degree of coherence in the law or attempt to make retrospectively 
impose a sense of order on the pre-existing uncertainty.  It was not until the 16th century that 
States began to assert limited jurisdiction over coastal waters, thereby creating the conditions 
for more extensive domestic fishing rights.  And it was not until the 17th century that writers, 
such as Grotius and Selden, devoted any time to considering the regulation of coastal spaces and 
presenting a systematic account of rights and duties therein, and of their philosophical or legal 
basis.  From this point on more coherent account of fishing rights, which reconciled domestic 
practices with the limits of States authority were possible.  In short, the vast scale of the oceans, 
the general absence of conflicts between users which might generate political motive for 
regulation, the practical difficulties of asserting authority and the absences of clear juridical 
basis for exclusive claims combined to produce a general liberty to use the seas.  As Judge 
Alvarez stated in his Individual Opinion in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ‘[f]or centuries, 
because of the vastness of the sea and the limited relationships between States the use of the 
sea was subject to no rules; every State could do as it pleased’.24   There were limited exceptions 
to this, as noted below, but these tended to be ad hoc and highly localised situations.   
Matters began to change in the early 17th century.  The colonial ambitions of European 
powers generated considerable interest in the legal regime of the seas, and the legitimacy of 
claims to inclusive or exclusive authority.  Grotius, acting on behalf of the Dutch East Indies 
Company sought to defend the freedom of the Dutch to navigate the oceans and advanced his 
theory of mare liberum against the exclusive maritime dominion asserted by the Spain and 
Portugal.   The British soon entered this debate, initially as a means of defending the interests of 
domestic fishermen against the more effective Dutch fishing fleet that was thriving in the North 
                                                   
21 T. Digges, Arguments proving the Queens Maties Propertye in the Sea Landes and Salt Shores Thereof 
(1569), reprinted in S.A. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and the law relating thereto. With a hitherto 
unpublished treatise by Lord Hale, Lord Hale's “De Jure Maris,” and Hall's Essay on the Rights of the Crown in 
the Sea-shore, 3rd ed. (1888), p. 185. 
22 Sir John Dee, General and Rare memorials pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navigation (1577). 
23 Moore and Moore indicate the existence of tidal fisheries as far back as the Domesday booking the 11th 
century.  However, this appears to be simply evidence of a practice.  The actual legal basis of such 
fisheries is not at all clear.  See above note 11, pp. 1-5 and 6. 
24 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case [1951] ICJ Rep. 116, 146. 
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Sea, and then using fisheries as the foundation of its maritime wealth and power.25  A strong 
domestic fishery could supply the skill and experience necessary for the development of a 
powerful navy. Among the first jurists to assert a the coastal States claim to exclusive authority 
over fisheries was the Scots lawyer William Welwood in 1613, who argued that overfishing 
demanded some means of reserving coastal fisheries for the coastal State.26  As he wrote: 
‘the primitive and exclusive right of the inhabitants of a country to the fisheries along their 
coasts; one of the principle reasons for which this part of the sea must belong to the littoral 
State being the risk that these fisheries may be exhausted as a result of the free use of them by 
everybody.’27  
His argument was intended to justify British claims against other States, rather than designate 
fisheries either public or private.  Of course, a claim to exclusive fisheries against other States 
could only have persuasive force if the right was vested in the authority of the King rather than 
the ordinary people.  Claims of individuals could not be made against foreign powers, but rights 
of the King.  The King was the external representation of the State.  The important point to note 
is that the strength of any rights or liberty of private persons for fish was contingent upon the 
Crowns ability to defend such claims externally.  Thus fishing rights were intimately related to 
the assertion of Crown authority in their formative stages.  
The 17
th
 century witnessed a marked outpouring of legal opinions devoted to defending the 
claims to crown authority over coastal waters.  In a series of lectures delivered at Grey’s Inn, Serjeant 
Callis argued for a Mare Anglicum on the basis of sovereignty, jurisdiction, property and possession.
28
 
In 1633, Sir John Burroughs wrote The Sovereignty of the British Seas which forcefully argued for 
English dominion over the seas, drawing upon an array of documents.  However, Fulton notes 
that the treatise was more a list of claims and devoid of reason based upon law.29  Moreover it 
was not published until 1651 and so was limited in its initial influence.  John Selden assumed 
the mantle and presented the most compelling defence of English authority over coastal waters 
in his treatise Mare Liberum (1635).30  Unlike Welwood, Selden was more concerned with 
maritime authority in general, rather than the limited matter of fisheries.  That said the need to 
secure exclusive State authority over fisheries was necessary for Selden.  The sea, ‘by reason of 
other men’s Fishing, Navigation and Commerce, becomes the wors for him that owns it and 
others that enjoie it in his rights; so that the less profit ariseth, then might otherwise bee 
                                                   
25 See T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (London, Blackwood, 1911), chapters IV and V. 
26 See M.J van Ittersum, ‘Mare Liberum Versus the Propriety of the Seas?’  (2006) Edinburgh Law Review 
239. 
27 W. Welwood, An Abridgment of All Sea Laws (1613), chapter 26. 
28 R. Callis, Reading of the famous and learned Robert Callis, esqr., upon the Statute of Sewers (1622) 23 
Hen. VIII., c. 5, 16. (Fourth ed. by W.J. Broderip, 1824). 
29 Fulton, above note 25, p. 366. 
30 J. Selden, Mare Clausum (1635), translation by M. Needham (London, 1652). 
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received therby.’31  For a time, the book assumed both legal and political significance because its 
publication coincided with Charles I assertions of maritime authority against European nations.  
Its subsequent legal authority was strengthened through the approval or later writers such as 
Coke,
32
 Godolphin,
33
 Zouche,
34
 Codrington,
35
 Meadows,
36
 and Hale, who is discussed in more detail 
below.  
Although freedom of the seas became the dominant principle of maritime relations between 
States, it was yet conceded that a limited band of coastal waters was subject to the exclusive authority 
of the coastal States.
37
  This allowed for the development of more sophisticated domestic law rules 
pertaining to coastal fisheries.  In the common law the most important and detailed treatment of 
the subject was provided by Lord Hale, who wrote De Jure Maris circa 1670.38  As the most 
eminent judge of his generation, unsurprisingly, Hale’s legal opinions became highly 
authoritative in the common law courts and reference to De Jure Maris or Hale are a common 
feature of many 18th and 19th century decisions concerning fisheries in tidal waters.39  Hale 
states the origin of the public right of fishing in tidal waters to be in the King’s ownership of the 
soil of the sea.40  He goes on to note that ‘... the common people of England have a regular liberty 
of fishing in the sea or creeks and arms thereof, as a public common of piscary, and may not, 
without injury to their right, be restrained or it, unless in such places, or creeks, or navigable 
rivers where either the King or some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that 
common liberty.’41  This much differs little from the above commentaries, but stresses that the 
right of the King generates a common right of fishing.  This position is then little considered by 
writers, or, indeed, challenged, until the 20th century.  
 
Origin of the Public Right to Fish 
 
                                                   
31 Ibid, bk 1, p. 141. 
32 Although Coke’s Fourth Institute was published posthumously, it does however give a more considered 
view of the nature of the Crown’s rights of property in the English seas.  Sir E. Coke, The Fourth Part of the 
Institutes of the Lawes of England (1644), c. 22, 142. 
33 J. Godolphin, A View of the Admiral Jurisdiction (1661). 
34 R. Zouche, The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Asserted (1663), p. 20. 
35 R. Codrington, His Majesty's Propriety, and Dominion on the Brittish Seas Asserted: together with a true 
account of the Neatherlanders insupportable insolencies (1665), p. 1. 
36 Sir P. Meadows, Observations Concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas (1689), p. 42. 
37 Barnes, above note, 1, pp. 183ff 
38 Hale’s treatise was actually part of a larger tract in three parts: ‘Pars prima. De Jure Maris et 
Branchiorum eiusdem. Pars Secunda. De Portibus Maris. Pars tertia. Concerning the customs of goods 
imported and exported’.  De Jure Maris is reprinted in Moore, above note 21. 
39 See for example Bagott v. Orr (1801) 2 B. & S. 472.  Lord Blackburn quotes extensively from Hale in 
Neill v Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App. Cas. 135; Reece v Miller and others, (1882) 8 QBD 626, per Grove, 
J.; Henry Blake and Johyn Goodman, the Younger v. The Mayor and free Burgesses of the Borough of Saltash, 
(1882) 7 App. Cas. 633, per L. Blackburn (651); R v Musson, 8 E. & B. 900, 27 L. J. (M.C.) 100. 
40 De Jure Maris, p. 378. 
41 Ibid. p. 377. 
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As the above review of legal commentaries reveals, the position developed that both the public 
right of fishing and any private exception to this were rooted in the Crown’s ownership of the 
sea.  Given such assertions of a right of ownership it is important to see the extent to which this 
was manifest in domestic law.  The point of origin of this right in law is not entirely clear, but it 
is often mistakenly attributed to the Magna Carta.  For example, in the recent High Court 
decision in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council (1993) Evans LJ stated that ‘[b]efore Magna 
Carta, the Crown made grants of 'several fisheries' (private fishing rights) in areas of tidal 
waters, but this was regarded as an abuse which Magna Carta ended in 1215.’  42   However, the 
Magna Carta says nothing directly about private or public rights in marine fisheries.  And it is 
certainly clear that it makes no such prohibition on private rights.  The only relevant provisions of 
the charter are Chapter 23 and Chapter 16 (of the third revision).  Chapter 23, reads: ‘Omnes 
kidelli decetero deponantur penitus per Tamisiam et Medeweiam et per totam Angliam, nisi per 
costeram maris.’  This translates as ‘All fish-weirs shall be removed from the Thames, the 
Medway, and throughout the whole of England, except on the sea coast.’  The provision was 
apparently designed to protect free navigation on rivers, hence the requirement to remove 
obstacles to navigation on rivers, but not the sea-coast, where weirs would not necessarily 
impede navigation.43  Farnham, a leading US scholar who researched the development of waters 
rights extensively under the common law, notes that the Charter simply cannot sustain the 
interpretation placed upon it.44   The other provision relied upon as limiting the Crown’s right to 
grant a several fishery is attributed to Blackstone, who stated that exclusive rights of fishing in 
“public” rivers could not “at present be granted, by the express provision of magna carta, c. 
16’.45  This assertion is not supported by the actual text of chapter 16, which is  translates as: ‘No 
river banks shall be guarded (placed in defence – defandantur) from henceforth, but such as 
were in defence in the time of King Henry, our grandfather, by the same places and the same 
bounds as they were wont to be in his time.’ It is doubtful that this can be read as precluding the 
grant of several fisheries, and Farnham attributes the error to Coke, who incorrectly read the 
provision as affecting the grant of private fisheries.46 
If the attribution of the public right of fishing to the Magna Carta is a legal fiction, then 
how far back can the right be traced as a matter of law.  Most authorities and judges attribute 
the rule to the House of Lords in the seminal case of William Malcomson v. John O’Dea and Others 
(1863).47  As noted below, a number of earlier cases did uphold the right, but as decisions of 
lower courts they are not regarded as important.  Malcomson is authority for the position that 
                                                   
42  Anderson v. Alnwick District Council [1993] 3 All ER 613, per Evans LJ at 621. 
43 In support of this view, see Hale, De Jure Maris, chapter 3.  
44  Farnham, above note 15, para 369. 
45 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1766) at 417. 
46 Farnham, above note 15, p. 1370, para 369. 
47 (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155. (Hereafter Malcomson). 
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the Crown cannot grant a several fishery (private property in a fishery) since the Magna Carta, 
and that in the absence of any such proven claim there remains a general public right of fishing 
on tidal waters.48  The limitation on the creation of private fisheries is not complete.  Thus 
Malcomson partially circumvents its own prohibition on new grants by permitting exclusive 
rights to be acquired by prescription, through evidence of long-standing exclusive use of a 
fishery, which cannot be traced back to a time subsequent to the Charter.49  Interestingly, the 
law report actually records the view that the Magna Carta could not sustain the meaning placed 
upon it.50  However, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, Mr Willes, J, stated that: 
‘The soil of "navigable tidal rivers," like the Shannon, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is 
prima facie in the Crown, and the right of fishery prima facie in the public. But for Magna Charta, 
the Crown could, by its prerogative, exclude the public from such prima facie right, and grant the 
exclusive right of fishery to a private individual, either together with or distinct from the soil. 
And the great charter left untouched all fisheries which were made several, to the exclusion of 
the public, by Act of the Crown not later than the reign of Henry II.’  Although earlier cases 
touched upon this matter, it is more than arguable that this was at least an example of judicial 
law-making.  Of course, this would only be acceptable if the outcome was also politically 
desirable, and it seems clear that by the mid-nineteenth century there were strong social, 
economic and political reasons to support a strong public fishing industry absent any 
limitations under private law.  Britain was at the forefront of the industrial revolution and 
needed to satisfy the appetites of a growing population.51  Knauss notes that in 1866 a Royal 
Commission famously repealed in whole or part 65 pieces of legislation that limited fishing 
efforts.  Capturing the free market political context rather nicely, he quotes Thomas Huxley, 
President of the British Royal Society and one of the most influential figures in regulation of 
British fisheries of the time:  
‘Now every legislative restriction means . . . a simple man of the people earning a scanty 
livelihood by hard toil, shall be liable to fine or imprisonment for doing that which he and his 
father’s before him have, up to this time, been free to do. If the general interest clearly 
requires that this burden should be put on the fisherman—well and good. But if it does not—
if indeed there is any doubt upon the matter—I think the man who has made the unnecessary 
law deserves a heavier punishment than the man who breaks it.’52 
                                                   
48 See Moore and Moore, above note 11, p. 8-18. 
49 Malcomson v. O’Dea, at 618.  Also Duke of Northumberland v. Houghton, (1870) LR  5 Ex. 127; Tighe v. 
Simnot [1897] Ir. R. 140. 
50 Above note 47, at 603. 
51 J.A. Knauss , ‘The Growth of British Fisheries During the Industrial Revolution’ (2005) 36 Ocean 
Development and International Law 1-11. 
52 Ibid., p. 4.  For the original see, The Fisheries Exhibition Literature, (London, William Clowes and Son 
Ltd, 1884), vol. 4, p. 18. 
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Moreover, the perpetuation of public rights to fish was wholly consistent with a more expansive 
fishing effort on the high seas and, indeed, off the coasts of other countries.    
 Political demands aside, as noted above, a number cases preceding Malcomson assert, or 
imply the existence of public right of fishing.  Most such cases dealt with navigable rivers, rather 
than the sea, but several that the public nature of fishing rights on such rivers is the same as that 
on the open sea.  The earliest noted appears to be the Case of the Royal fishery of the river Bann 
in Ireland (1610) which concerned fisheries in the tidal waters of a river.53  Here the Court 
confirmed the pre-existing nature of Crown rights in the soil and fishery of a river, which could 
be granted to riparian landowners.  It may be noted that the approach of the court in this and 
other cases was that the right was deemed to exist before the dispute in law, rather than emerge 
as a remedy of the court.  Thus, in Lord Fitzwalter's case (1673), the right is implicitly accepted 
in the court’s reasoning about the existence of a burden on a person claiming an exclusive right 
in a tidal river.54  In Warren v. Matthews (1703) Sir John Holt held it was held that every subject 
of the common right may fish with lawful nets in a navigable river as well as in the sea.55  
Moreover, the court held that the Crown cannot bar such a right by the grant of a private fishery.  
However, this has position is somewhat misleading since in the same case the court sought to 
allow such title to be tested and it runs counter to the general line of other authorities, which 
accept exclusive fishing rights by way of ancient grant or usage.56  In Ward v. Cresswell (1741), 
as quoted in the later case of Bagott v. Orr, the Court held that ‘all the subjects of England of 
common right might fish is the sea; it being for the good of the commonwealth, and for the 
sustenance of all the people of the realm’.57  In Carter v. Murcot (1768), the public right was 
again implicit in the need for the plaintiff bear the burden of showing the existence of a several 
fishery on a tidal river.58   Mayor of Orford v. Richardson (1791) implicitly confirms the right to 
fish, although the Court was focused mainly on the procedural aspects of a how public and 
private claims are presented.59  One of the most important cases was Bagott v. Orr (1801), 
which concerned the prima facie right to take fish between the high and low water mark and it 
is one of the few cases to actually articulate upon the nature of the right.60  As the court stated: 
‘The right of fishing in the sea is acknowledged by all nations; it is universal, and part of the law 
of nations’.61  Interestingly, the court was able to draw upon the now generally accepted 
                                                   
53 (1610) Dav. Rep. 55; Salk. 137 
54 (1673) 1 Mod. 106. (1673) 84 ER 766. 
55 (1703) 6 Mod. 73, (1703) 87 ER 831. 
56 This point was explicitly reviewed by the US Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, (1842) 41 US 
367, 425. 
57 (1741) Willes' Rep. 265.  
58 (1768) 4 Burr. 2163, (1768) 98 ER 127. 
59 (1791) 4 TR 438; (1791) 100 ER 1106. 
60 (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 472; (1801) 126 ER 1391. 
61 Ibid, at 1393, citing Hugo Grotius. 
  12 
authority of international law, and general agreement about the freedom to fish on the high 
seas, to justify a matter of domestic law.  This seems to draw upon the idea advanced by Grotius 
that the seas are inexhaustible in their nature and cannot be improved upon by subjecting them 
to exclusive rights.  The court also explicitly drew upon the authorities of Bracton and Hale, and 
shows the growing influence of doctrine in the development of the principle of a public nright to 
fish.  Soon afterwards, Rogers and Other v. Allen (1808) restated, indirectly, the common right of 
the King’s subject to fish in the sea, and noted that any grant of a several fishery much be one 
that dated back to the time of Henry II.62  Again, Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell (1826) confirms 
that a franchised fishery could not be established after the Magna Carta.63  Although this 
appears to suggest a reasonably coherent basis in law for the decision in Malcomson, the 
restrictions of the Magna Carta were not restated in all cases.64  However, these exceptional 
cases seem to be instances of limited reasoning, rather than any explicit acknowledgement that 
there exists a general right to grant several fisheries in tidal waters.   
 Since Malcomson, the public right to fish has been carefully observed by the courts, 
although it has been little developed and most of the case law on fisheries in tidal waters has 
been notoriously deficient in its discussion of this point.  Indeed, there appears to be a degree of 
retrenchment from the high point of Malcomson.  In Neill v. Duke of Devonshire, there is an 
indication that the decision in Malcomson was not being properly understood.65 Thus Lord 
Blackburn stressed that ‘[i]t is not law, and this can never be too often repeated, that the Crown 
cannot grant a several fishery in tidal waters since Magna Charta. Such a statement is illusory 
and contrary to law.”66  Such a fishery could have been created if the fishery existed prior to the 
Charter.  Furthermore, the court was carefully to uphold the core ratio of Malcomson, that ‘no 
new exclusive fishery could be created by royal grant, though all fisheries were left untouched 
which were made several to the exclusion of the public not later than the time of legal 
memory’.67  Lord Blackburn cited Hale with approval to show that although the King exercised  
ownership rights over the seas, the public also enjoyed a ‘public common of piscary’ that could 
not be exclusded unless a long standing private right of fishing had been enjoyed.68  The court 
then went on to state those circumstances in which evidence of a private fishery could be 
adduced. 
                                                   
62 (1808) 1 Camp. 309; (1808) 170 ER 967. (citing Ward v. Cresswell and Bagott v Orr).   
63 (1826) 5 B. & C. 875; 108 ER 325. 
64 See for example, Lord Fitzwalter’s case, above note 54; Warren v. Matthews above note 55; Carter v. 
Murcot, above note 58. 
65 Above note 39. 
66 Ibid, at p. 180. 
67 Ibid, p. 178. 
68 Ibid, p. 177. 
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 Other relevant cases include R.v. Stimpson (1863), which held that a right of fishing in a 
tidal navigable river is prima facie public.69  In Murphy v. Ryan (1868) the court stated the right 
to be limited the tidal parts of rivers.  It did not apply to non-tidal parts of the river.70  The court 
in Bloomfield v. Johnston (1868) denied the right application to Loch Erne because it was not 
tidal.71  Interestingly, Mayor and Corporation of Carlisle v. Graham and another (1869) confirmed 
the limitations supposedly introduced by the Magna Charta, but held that when a tidal river 
changes its course, the new channel does not carry with it the several fishery on the old 
channel.72  In Brew v. Haren (1877), Lawson, J. stated that the ‘right of the public to take 
[seaweed] when floating … is as clear as their right to catch fish in the ocean.’73  It thus 
confirmed the public right to fish and extended it to ancillary or related activities.  Despite some 
earlier reservations about the reasoning in Malcomson, Lord Blackburn eventually accepted the 
rule in Malcomson in the Goodman and another v. Saltash Corporation (1882).74  
 During the twentieth century the public right of fishing was less frequently the object of 
litigation.  In part this is likely to be the result of the fact that since the mid 19th century the 
commercial exercise of fishing rights was effectively put on a statutory basis.75  Several cases 
reaffirmed the right, including Lord Advocate v. Wemyss (1900),76 Truro v. Rowe (1902),77 Parker 
v. Lord Advocate (1904),78 and Fitzhardinge v. Purcell (1908).79  In 1914, the Privy Council 
provided one of the more detailed modern review of the public right in Attorney-General of 
British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada.80 Viscount Haldane noted that ‘the legal character 
of this right is not easy to define. It is probably a right enjoyed so far as the high seas are 
concerned by common practice from time immemorial, and it was probably in very early times 
extended by the subject without challenge to the foreshore and tidal waters which were 
continuous with the ocean, if, indeed, it did not in fact first take rise in them’.81   Haldane 
compared the right to fish to the right of navigation, noting that the Crown regarded itself as 
                                                   
69 (1863) 27 JP 678, 4 B & S 301. 
70 (1868) IR 2 CL 143. ‘But whilst the right of fishing in fresh water rivers in which the soil belongs to the 
riparian owners is thus exclusive, the right of fishing in the sea, its arms and estuaries, and in its tidal 
waters, wherever it ebbs and flows, is held by the common law to be publici juris, and so to belong to all 
the subjects of the Crown, the soil of the sea, and its arms and estuaries and tidal waters being vested in 
the sovereign as a trustee for the public.’ (at 149). 
71 (1868) Ir . Rep 8 Cl 68. 
72 (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. 361, per Kelly, CB at 367-8. 
73 (1877) 11 IR CL 198. 
74 (1882) 7 App. Cas. 633; [1881-1885] All ER Rep 1076, at 1085. 
75 See especially, the Sea Fisheries Act 1843 and the Sea Fisheries Act 1868. 
76 [1900] AC 48. 
77 [1902] 2 KB 709. 
78 [1904] AC 364. 
79 [1908] 2 Ch. 139. 
80 [1914] AC 153, at pp. 168-71.  The existence of the right was later reaffirmed in Attorney-General for 
Canada v. Attorney General for British Columbia and other [1930] AC 111. 
81 Attorney-General of British Columbia [1914], ibid, at p. 169. 
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‘parens patri’, responsible for protecting the rights of the nation.82  From this the Crown’s 
protective role evolved into an enforceable right for subjects of the Crown.    
 In Stephens v. Snell (1939), one of the few cases dealing with the enforcement of 
exclusive rights against the public right of fishing, the plaintiff succeeded in a case against a 
fisherman for trespass on his several fishery in the tidal waters of Axmouth harbour.83.  Judicial 
consideration of the issue then lapsed for a long while until the the public right of fishing was 
strongly reaffirmed by the High Court in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council (1993).84  In the 
context of justifying the extension of the rights to the matter of digging bait, the court stated: 
‘We base our decision, however, on wider grounds. Many of the authorities show that the 
underlying reasons for the public rights to navigate and to fish were economic. Sea fishing from 
boats or from the land was a vital source of food for many coastal communities. The public right 
to take fish from the sea and tidal waters was jealously guarded from Magna Carta onwards.’85  
An equally firm approach to protecting public rights was upheld in Adair v. National Trust 
(1998), when Girvin, J. stated that at ‘common law there is a public right to take fish from the 
tidal waters around the Kingdom. The common law right extends to the tidal reaches of all 
rivers and estuaries and in the sea and arms of the sea within the territorial limits of the 
Kingdom.’86 The position in Malcomson was accepted without hesitation. More recently the right 
was acknowledged in Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v. NV Royale Belge (2000),87 and Isle of Anglesey County 
Council v. Welsh Ministers and others (2009).88  In the former, the question arose as to whether 
or not an interference with a public right of fishing constituted a public nuisance.  The court 
restated the simple extent of the right as a ‘right to fish in tidal waters is a right to take fish, 
including shellfish, by whatever means are considered effective, subject to any statutory 
restrictions’  Interestingly, the High Court held that interference with such a right is capable of 
constituting a public nuisance.89  In the latter case, the court also accepted the existence of the 
right, and indicated that a landowner could not ‘carry out works which “substantially 
interfered” with public's fishery rights’.90  However, the precise extent of this was not developed 
any further. 
 The attempt to tie the public right of fishing to the Magna Carta appears to be an 
example of judicial law-making and it is doubtful that this can sustained.  At the very least it is a 
case of the court reading a political intention into a law far beyond the text is capable of 
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supporting alone.  However, the right can be traced back in the common law at least as far back 
as 1610, and may have received earlier judicial recognition.  Regardless of any concerns about 
the basis of the rule in Malcomson, it has since been accepted as good law.  As Viscount Haldane 
stated in Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney General of Canada: ‘Since the decision of 
the House of Lords in Malcomson v. O'Dea, it has been unquestioned law that since Magna Charta 
no new exclusive fishery could be created by Royal grant in tidal waters, and that no public right 
of fishing in such waters, then existing, can be taken away without competent legislation’.91  In 
light of this general proposition, the issue is not so much the existence of a general public right 
to fish, but rather whether this has been lawfully restricted in any particular area, and the 
extent to which it can be varied, lost or regulated.  There appears to be evidence in the 
Domesday Book of many exclusive tidal fisheries.  However, the true extent of these is difficult 
to gauge.  The fisheries were not delimited, and may refer to fishing by more limited means, 
rather than be evidence of a widely drawn private right.92  Hall considers such grants to be rare, 
and limited to those places capable of sustaining exclusive possession.93  This seems to infer that 
such private fisheries were closely connected to the holder’s capacity to exercise some degree of 
practical exclusion of others from the fishing ground.  They also appear to be limited to 
estuaries and waters around certain towns.94  There is little evidence of such rights extending to 
tidal waters at a distance from the shore.  However, this does raise interesting questions about 
the relationship between the public right to fish and the freedom to fish on the high seas.   
 
 
The Nature of the Public Right to Fish 
 
General acceptance of the right and its material extent 
 
As discussed above, there legal recognition, and a general acceptance among expert 
commentators as to the existence, of the public right to fish.95  Unfortunately, this is often 
considered in short measure.  In 1875, Hall described the 'public or general right of fishing in 
the sea' as 'a beneficial privilege enjoyed by British subjects since time out of mind'.96  He goes 
on to state that the precise origins, whether a reservation by the people of a right, or the public 
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grant from the King, are immaterial.97  It is suggested that the nature of the original right is 
linked to the scope of the right.    In this context one general theme is important – the link 
between ownership of land and fishing rights on superadjacent waters.  It appears that the right 
to fish was originally regarded as deriving from ownership of the soil over which the water 
flowed.98  Property rights attached to land, certainly in the feudal tradition, and interests in the 
water over land were ancillary to this.  Indeed, the general position in respect of fisheries under 
the common law is to regard them, prima facie, as profits.  There is a presumption that the 
owner of the soil (land) retains ownership of the fishery in the water above the soil.  The 
treatment of fisheries as an incident of land ownership continues.  Thus Halsbury’s indicates 
that rights to swimming fish pass with the land and are ‘an incident of the ownership of the 
soil’.99  If this holds true, then the public right to fish may be limited by the extent to which 
ownership of land, or the seabed, was conceived.  As noted below, this indicates that it was, at 
least originally, confined to a small margin of coastal waters.    Another point to note is that 
evidence may be adduced of the grant of the right to the fishery separate from ownership of the 
soil.100  Like other forms of property, it is not uncommon to find varying incidents of ownership 
vested in different persons, to varying degrees. 
As a common law institution, the public right to fish developed piecemeal.101  This makes 
it difficult to ascertain a single coherent or principled statement of the nature of the right.  We 
can survey various cases and draw out aspects of the right.  To start with, the right clearly 
permits fishing from boats, and this is distinct from the public right of navigation.102 It is not 
limited to mere fishing, but includes necessary ancillary rights.  An incident of the public right to 
fish is the right to use the sea shore for purposes essential to the enjoyment of the right of 
fishery.103  This is confirmed in Anderson v. Alnwick District Council, where it was held to extend 
to ancillary rights, such as the right to cross the foreshore in order to exercise the right.104  The 
same case also confirmed that it included the right to collect bait from the foreshore as would be 
necessary to facilitate the public right of fishing. 
A second observation is that regardless of judicial accounts of the nature and scope of 
the right, there are now in place many more modern restrictions on the right than were 
articulated during its early development. These are predominantly set out in legislation, for it 
remains within the authority of Parliament to legislate such matters as it sees fit.  Of course, this 
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may be subject to certain limitations on the authority of Parliament.105  The public right to fish 
under the common law developed at a time when fisheries were not threatened by depletion, 
and there was less concern with protection of the environment.  Such matters are not fully 
accounted for in the common law right.  However, as Girvin J. noted in Adair, the common law 
right is so entrenched that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to regulate the common law 
right.106  Such has been done through various fisheries legislation.107  Such legislation is quite 
extensive, and it goes beyond the scope of this report to detail such legislative controls on sea 
fisheries.  It may also be noted that Parliament may grant exclusive fisheries in tidal waters.108  
This much is now entrenched in statute, as per section 1 (3) of the Sea Fishery (Shellfish) Act 
1967. 
A final point to note here is that is not perfectly clear is whether the public right of 
fishing is a right or a liberty.  A liberty (or privilege) is normally understood as meaning that a 
person is free to do something, whereas a right is usually conceived of as a claim against 
another person.  In the case law, both terms are used to describe public fishing.109 However, a 
preponderance of the cases indicates that the public right of fishing is more closely aligned with 
a liberty or privilege.  Thus most cases have concerned the use of the public right as a defence 
against interference with the pre-existing liberty.  There are no examples of the right being 
exercised in a way that requires other persons to do something positive to ensure the exercise 
of the right.  As such the use of the term ‘right’ seems to be a more limited acknowledgement of 
the fact that it is legally recognised entitlement. 
 
Holders of the Public Right to Fish 
 
Common law authorities indicate the right vests in the ‘public’ or in subjects of the crown.  Thus 
the right can be exercised by individuals qua members of the public.  There is nothing in 
principle limiting its exercise by individuals in a commercial context.  In Anderson, the right to 
collect bait which is ancillary to the right to fish, was limited to bait digging to facilitate fishing; 
but it was not permitted for commercial sale.110  However, the limitation in this case only 
extends to ancillary rights, and not the right to fish itself.  Historically, the public right to fish 
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right appears to be limited to British nationals, although this does not appear to have been 
tested in court.  This is linked to the political motivation surrounding the extension of exclusive 
control over fishing in coastal waters, rather operating as some form of right enjoyed 
exclusively by nationals.  There is no evidence to suggest that fishermen of any nationality could 
not fish in coastal waters so long as they were fishing from Britain, rather fishing as distant 
water fleets.  Wisdom indicates that a foreign fishing vessel would be entitled to fish in British 
waters so long as it complies with any statutory permission to do so.111  The most significant 
entitlement to fish is afforded to vessels of other member States of the EU under the common 
fisheries policy.    In most cases, the right has been asserted by individuals and used to challenge 
claims of exclusive fisheries.  In practice there would seem to be little point in limiting the right, 
as exercised for recreational purposes, to purely British nationals given the practical problem of 
controlling diffuse small scale low-impact fishing. 
For commercial fishing purposes, it is important to note that the common law has long 
since been overtaken by statutory regulation.  Legislation does not generally remove the right, 
but determines how and when it can be exercised.  This may limit the exercise of fishing rights 
in practice considerably.  However, apart from instances of several rights being created in shell 
fisheries, such regulation has generally been limited to setting conditions for the exercise of 
fishing rights, such as the use of particular gear, or fishing seasons.  It is crucial to understand 
that there is nothing that limits the right of the government to regulate fishing activities.  Of 
course, questions remain as to whether such regulation that effectively reduced fishing to 
exclusive private property would be permitted, and if so under what circumstances it would be 
deemed to be either politically or legally permissible. 
 
The Nature of the Crown’s Responsibilities. 
 
It is clear that the Crown originally exercised ownership rights over coastal waters, and this 
extended to the fish, as profits thereof.  Some writers have argued that the Crown’s original 
position of ownership has developed into a form of trusteeship.  Thus Farnham notes that the 
King would have had neither the time nor the inclination to exploit the fish for his own benefit, 
nor prevent his subjects fishing as they needed.112  This and subsequent efforts to limit the 
power of the Crown resulted in the formulation of the idea that the Crown held the rights to fish 
in trust for the people.113  However, there is no explicit basis for this ‘doctrine of trust’ and in the 
Case of the Royal Fishery of the Banne, the court explicitly refused to deal with a fishery at the 
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King’s pleasure in such a way.114  Farnham accepted that the trust doctrine did not emerge until 
the after the deposition of Charles I.  However, quite how the Crown’s right to deal freely with 
fisheries that it owned became limited is unclear.  American law, in contrast to English law, 
developed the public trust doctrine to accommodate this tension between ownership of 
resources and public rights.115  Such an approach is peculiar to US jurisprudence and did not 
evolve in the English common law.  Viscount Haldane, in the AG of British Columbia, indicated 
that the Crown acted as ‘parens patri’ in order to protect the interests of persons engaged in 
fisheries.116  This form of protection then evolved into a legal right.  All that appears to remain is 
a responsibility of the state, either by way of legislative control, or judicial protection, to ensure 
that the public right of fishing is not unreasonably fettered, or infringed by unfounded private 
claims to exclusive fishing in tidal waters.   
 
Geographic Scope of the Public Right to Fish 
 
The geographic scope of the public right to fish requires careful consideration because the 
spatial jurisdiction or sovereignty of the State has evolved since the earliest times when any 
public right was asserted.  The general position is that the public have a ‘liberty of fishing in the 
sea and the creeks or arms thereof’.117  This includes fishing upon the foreshore between the 
high and low water mark, as well as the taking of shellfish,118  so long as such have not been 
reduced to the possession of another by cultivation.119   The extent of fishing on creeks or arms 
of the sea has been much discussed.  In general the right is limited to the tidal part of a river.120 
The preferred extent of tidal waters is where the water flows and reflows.121 This means that 
the precise limits of the tidal part of a river is a question of fact 
Historically speaking, the seaward extent of the public right of fishing is not clearly 
stated in the common law.  All that can be inferred is that it was linked to the extent of the 
Crown’s ownership of the sea around the coast of England.  This can be traced back to the 
writings of Thomas Digges (1589) 122 and was strongly maintained by English jurists.123  A 
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central role can be attributed to John Selden’s highly influential text, Mare Clausum (1635), 
which sought to justify King Charles I’s ownership of the British Seas.124  Such ownership 
extended the water and the seabed, and all things therein.125  This posited ownership of fish in 
the Crown and there is evidence to support the Crown treating the sea and fisheries as property.  
The Crown’s right of property in territorial waters was reaffirmed in the important cases of 
Gammell v. Commissioners of Woods and Forests (1859)126 and the Whitstable Fisheries case 
(1864).127  Unfortunately, the precise extent of the Crown’s sovereignty or ownership is not 
made clear in these cases.  Thus, in the Whitstable Fisheries case, this is stated to be the assumed 
distance of a cannon-shot from the shore.128  There are indications that this might have been 
regarded as more extensive and subject only to the extent that the King could control.  Indeed, 
in Attorney-General for British Columbia, Viscount Haldane considered it was clear that Lord 
Hale meant to include in the dominion of the Crown something much wider even than this’ (i.e. 
3 mile limit).129  However, there was little consideration of such matters in the common law 
prior to the nineteenth century.  As indicated above, most disputes related to conflicts between 
public fishing rights and claims of excusive fisheries, and the latter were limited to coastal 
waters near to shore and arms of the sea.  Beyond coastal waters it was clear the freedom of the 
high seas prevailed and so there was no need to assert some form of public right to fish derived 
from Crown ownership of the seas.  It may also be noted that international assertions to wider 
maritime dominion had lapsed before many fisheries cases came before the courts., and there 
was little concern with the extent of the Crown’s rights of ownership in the seas until the 
nineteenth century.  
R. v. Keyn (1876) is taken to be authority that the common law did not extend beyond 
the low water mark.130  However, this case concerned the assertion of criminal jurisdiction, and 
it is doubtful that it in anyway limited other common law doctrines, particularly the public right 
to fish.  Since this time, the nature of the Crown’s rights in the territorial sea ceased to be 
couched in terms of ownership, but rather sovereignty, as this became the accepted juridical 
                                                                                                                                                              
British Seas (Edinburgh, W Green and Son, 1633), reprinted London (1739) 43; Sir E Coke, The Fourth 
Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (London, 1644) c 22, 142; J. Godolphin, A View of the Admiral 
Jurisdiction (London, Godbin, 1661); R. Zouche, The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Asserted 
(London, F. Tyton and T Dring, 1663), p. 20; R. Codrington, His Majesty’s Propriety, and Dominion on the 
Brittish Seas Asserted: together with a true account of the Neatherlanders insupportable insolencies 
(London, T Mabb, 1665), p.1;Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Jure Maris, extracted from Moore, above note 21, 
p. 367. Sir P Meadows, Observations Concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas (London, E 
Jones, 1689), p.  42. 
124 J. Selden, Mare Clausum (1635), trans M Needham (London, 1652).  See also See Sir John Boroughs, The 
Sovereignty of the British Seas (London, 1633). 
125 A position adopted by Hall, above note 93, pp. 2-7. 
126 (1859) 3 Macq. 174. 
127 Gann v. The Free Fishers of Whitstable  (1865) XI HLC 191; (1865) 11 ER 1305. 
128 Above note 11, p. 1316. 
129 Above note 80, at p. 169. 
130 (1876)  2 Ex. D. 63. 
  21 
nature of the territorial sea.  This does not however, restrict the Crown’s assumed proprietary 
interests in the waters or seabed of the territorial sea under the common law.131 
 It is generally accepted that the domestic limits of the territorial sea must accord with 
international law.  As is well known by students of the history of the law of the sea,  the breadth 
of the territorial sea was long a matter of controversy and variation in practice between States.  
Until the mid-18th century the existence and limit of territorial waters was heavily debated by 
scholars.  In 1744, Bynkershoek formulated the cannon-shot rule, which asserted that exclusive 
control over coastal waters extended as far as could be defended by the shot of a cannon.132  At 
the same time Scandinavian States asserted exclusive control over a belt of waters extending to 
approximately 1 league.  It was not until the late 18th century that these discreet limits coalesced 
in a more uniform limit of 3nm.  This limit was generally adhered to by maritime powers 
including the United Kingdom, but never formally agreed, or accepted by all States as a general 
rule of international law.  This position continued until the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) set the limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles.133  
 As a result of the uncertainty in the common law, the seaward limit of the public right to 
fish has since been set by statute.  The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1887 assumed a 
seaward limit of 3 nautical miles.  However, the Act did not actually delimit the territorial sea at 
3nm; section 7 merely refers waters ‘deemed by international law to be within the territorial 
sovereignty of Her Majesty’.  To the extent that international could be said to limit the territorial 
sea to 3 miles, then this might have fixed the limits of the territorial sea.134  This was not a 
particularly clear example of legislative drafting.  Despite this, the actual limit was not adjusted 
until 1987, when the territorial sea was extended to 12 nautical miles for waters around the 
UK.135  Even now some anomalies remain.  For example, the 1987 Act provides that unless 
provided for by an Order in Council this does not apply to the Channel Islands.  Unlike Jersey, 
which was subject to an Order extending its territorial sea, the territorial sea around Guernsey 
remains limited, as a matter of domestic law, to 3nm.  This has since given rise to disputes 
concerning the states authority to regulate fisheries within what are normally considered to be 
territorial waters.136 
 Historically, there has been an important distinction between territorial waters and the 
high seas.  Within territorial waters, foreign nationals enjoy no rights to fish.  Thus the public 
right of fishing is enjoyed by nationals within territorial waters, subject to any limits resulting 
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from the grant of exclusive fisheries.  On the high seas, nationals of all States enjoy the right to 
fish on the high seas. The right is granted to States and may be exercised by their nationals, 
subject to limits on the States rights.137  Such limits include treaty obligations, general duties to 
conserve and manage living resources, and to cooperate with regard to conservation and 
management.  There is also a duty to have due regard to other users of the high seas.  The high 
seas are generally defined as those areas beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State.  
Initially this pertained to areas beyond the territorial sea, however far this stretched.  However, 
under the LOSC, the high seas are now limited to waters beyond 200nm since States may claim 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).138  Within this zone States enjoy sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting living resources.  This allows States to limit fishing 
opportunities to their nationals within the 200nm EEZ. 
 It has not been confirmed whether seaward extent of the public right to fish under the 
common law has kept pace with the limits of the territorial sea under international law or 
indeed the exclusive economic zone or equivalent fisheries zone..  There is some support for the 
view that the public right to fish is co-extensive with the territorial sea.  The Australian High 
Court in Commonwealth v. Yarmirr accepted that the common law followed Australia’s extended 
jurisdiction from 3 to 12 nm.139  From this is might be presumed that if the public right to fish is 
derived from the Crown’s ownership of the soil, then the right to fish will be coextensive with 
the geographic extent of the Crowns ownership rights.  Until the mid-19th century these were 
not restricted as to their seaward extent.  For a period from 1887 until 1987, the territorial sea 
was prima facie limited to 3 nm, and it would appear reasonable to assume the public right to 
fish was also so limited.  Beyond 3 nm, there remained the freedom to fish on the high seas, 
which rendered the need to argue a public right moot.  It seems inconceivable that a vacuum in 
fishing opportunities was intended to result from the extension of the territorial sea to 12 nm 
without any commensurate extension in public fishing rights to the same extent.  For this reason 
it seems sensible to hold that since 1987, the public right to fish has at least been extended to 12 
nm, co-extensive with the UK territorial sea.  In principle, there seems no reason why this 
entitlement does not also extend to waters forming part of any exclusive fisheries zone. 
  
Limitations on the Right 
 
The public right of fishing is not an absolute right.  Thus it may be subject to regulation and 
limitation by the State.  As a matter of principle this is quite reasonable.  Any liberty if used to 
                                                   
137 Article 116, LOSC. 
138 Articles 56-7 LOSC.  
139 [2001] HCA 56, at paras. 74-5. 
  23 
the absolute degree will be destructive of, or harmful to, the liberty of other persons.  More 
specifically, the unrestricted use of a public right to fish may result in the destruction of 
fishery.140  Capturing this view, the court stated in Lord Leconfield and others v. Lord Lonsdale 
that ‘[i]n the sea and tidal parts of rivers the public have the right of catching all the fish they 
can by all means which are not inconsistent with the equal rights of each other’.141  Although 
this was an obiter remark, it is consistent with the nature of an entitlement held by the public at 
large.  The common law might be viewing as placing some specific limits on fishing, such as 
limiting the quantity of fish that may be appropriated, gear to be used and times of fishing.  For 
example in Warren v. Matthews, the court refers to ‘lawful nets’ as a constraint on fishing.  
However, the fact is that any general requirement of reasonable use, or any specific from of 
Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Moore and Moore noted that the public right to fish 
must be exercised reasonably, and with respect to any applicable statutes.142  A final point to 
note hear is that although such rules do not destroy the public right to fish, rather they 
articulate how the right is to be exercised.   
 
Establishing a Claim to a Private Fishery 
 
Given that the one of the most significant limitations on the public right of fishing is the 
existence of a private or several fishery, it is helpful to consider how such can be established 
under the common law, and when this will be deemed to exclude the public right.  A line of 
authorities indicates that a person seeking to establish the existence of an exclusive fishing right 
has the burden of proof.  In Lord Fitzwalter’s case,143 Hale CJ held that a person claiming a free 
fishery, several fishery or commons of fishery, must provide evidence that he has the claimed 
right of fishing.  Thus the burden is on the party showing the public right of fishery has been 
removed.  This position is asserted in Carter v. Murcot.  ‘If any one claims it exclusively, he must 
show a right. If he can show a right by prescription, he may then exercise an exclusive right, 
though the presumption is against him, unless he can prove such a prescriptive right.’ This 
would require them to show on the balance of probabilities that the right exists.  As noted 
above, this can be done by establishing evidence of title going back to before 1215.  A second 
option is to establish, as per Malcomson, evidence of long-standing use.  This is important, as the 
courts have been prepared to accept such evidence to establish an exclusive fishery.  In Loose v. 
Castleton, the Court of Appeal held that once evidence was adduced of a long standing usage, the 
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burden then falls upon the party claiming a public right to show that the origin of the fishery is 
in fact modern, i.e. dating from 1189.144 
 Mere evidence of title, ‘a paper title’, is not sufficient to establish a private right of 
fishing.  The common law also requires ‘possession’, or rather evidence of acts of ownership.145  
The quality of such acts depends on the circumstances.  For example, proof of ownership of a 
fishing weir, or other means of taking fish may be evidence of ownership of the entire fishery.146  
Acts such as the fixing of stakes, building of piers or boathouses, taking of gravel, and other 
cultivating activities have been accepted as evidence of ownership of the soil, and hence right of 
an exclusive fishery.147  Of the forms of evidence, Moore and Moore indicate that evidence of 
netting is most important as this was the most common form of taking fish.148  Such acts have 
generally been limited to tidal waters immediately adjacent to the coast.  This is because it is 
simply impractical to manifest long-standing acts of ownership at a distance from the shore.  
Absent any evidence of title and acts of ownership the public right of fishing must be deemed to 
exist. 
 
The Effect of Establishing a Private Right 
 
Once title to fish in tidal waters has been lawfully and conclusively established, then no fishing 
by the public can displace the right.149  Interruption of a several fishery does not destroy the 
right vested in the holder.150  Normally, long evidence of use is allowed to support a claim that a 
right by prescription exists.  However, evidence of use does not displace a prescriptive right that 
is also supported by written title and evidenced by possession.151  Thus Moore and Moore to 
conclude that ‘once a several fishery always a several fishery.152  This is based upon the idea that 
any fishing in an area subject to a several fishery is either by express or implied permission by 
the owner.  Once a public right has been excluded, then it cannot be regained.  Of course, this 
ignores the possibility of the Crown reacquiring the several fishery and then reverting it back to 
a general public use.  Evidence of such acquisition and reversion would need to be established 
and no examples of this being done have been found.  One exception to this may be in the case 
where title to a several fishery has not been conclusively established, in which case, the long 
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standing evidence of public right of fishing may be used to dispute the existence of any such 
title.153  One should also distinguish a general public right of fishing from a right enjoyed by a 
more limited class of persons.  Such a right might be confused with a general public right to fish.  
For example inhabitants of towns or parishes have asserted rights to take fish in fisheries 
owned by public bodies.  Such rights to take fish have been difficult to establish, but in the case 
of Goodman v. The Mayor of Saltash, the House of Lords recognised that although the 
corporation held a several fishery, this was not an absolute or unqualified title for their sole 
benefit, but one held in trust for the benefit of inhabitants of the borough as evidenced by their 
usage.154  Thus inhabitants of the borough might fish in the area, but not the wider public. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
There exists a public right to fish for British vessels in British waters.  This right emerged under 
the common law and precedes much public regulation of fisheries.  As such, it might be viewed 
as supporting a presumption that fishing is permitted unless specifically restricted.  Its origins 
in law can be traced back with some certainty to 1610 and the River Bann fishery case, and it has 
been considered in numerous cases since, most recently being confirmed in Isle of Anglesey 
County Council v. Welsh Ministers and others (2009).  In 1863, in the case of Malcomson v. O’Dea, 
the House of Lords confirmed the right to have existed since the Magna Carta (1215).  Although 
this seems to be a legal fiction, it has since been generally accepted by judges and 
commentators. 
 The public right to fish exists in coastal waters extending to 12 nm and probably as far 
as the outer limits of an exclusive fisheries zone.  It includes tidal waters and arms of the sea.  It 
exists unless it can be established that there was granted a private fishery prior to the Magna 
Carta or which has since been evidenced by long-standing use.  The right is held by individuals 
as members of the public, although the category of persons is untested.  It extends to all fishing 
types and techniques in the territorial sea.  It includes fishing from boats, and allows for certain 
ancillary rights such as bait digging and permits access to the foreshore to facilitate fishing.  It 
may be restricted by legislation.  This has frequently be done under the various Sea Fisheries 
Acts, and associated delegated legislation.  It is also subject to a “reasonable use” requirement 
under the common law.  There is a general responsibility on the State not to unreasonably fetter 
the right.   
                                                   
153 Ibid, p. 153. 
154 (1882) 5 CPD 431; 7 App. Cas. 633. 
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If the general position is that there exists a general right to fish subject to any licensing 
or regulatory limitation deemed necessary to ensure the proper conservation and management 
of the fisheries then this raises at least one question: could such a public right be used to 
challenge fisheries legislation in general?  The lack of such challenges in the past suggests that 
this in unlikely.  However, the absence of challenge might simply be because fisheries legislation 
has not so far fundamentally challenged the existence of a public right to fish.  Also, it is  
probably undesirable that a general liberty to fish could be used to challenge statutory rules 
that properly seek to limit fishing effort in order to ensure sustainable fishing.  That said, at the 
time of writing, there is much interest in the use of rights-based fishing mechanisms gin, and 
these present a different order of change to fishing entitlements.  These can significantly alter 
the nature of fisheries because they can result in permanent and exclusive rights being vested in 
a limited category of persons.  As the experience of Iceland shows, unless such measures are 
strongly justified in terms of conservation and management needs, then they are vulnerable to 
challenge by fishing interests that have been disenfranchised.  If nothing else, this cautions a 
degree of sensitivity in the design of fisheries regimes, especially those that may limit public 
entitlements. 
 
 
